Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 6 Symposium

Article 12

7-1-1966

Recent Decisions
Stephen R. Lamantia
Gerard K. Sandweg
John Thomas Harty
Clifford A. Roe

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen R. Lamantia, Gerard K. Sandweg, John T. Harty & Clifford A. Roe, Recent Decisions, 41 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1009 (1966).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol41/iss6/12

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE -

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

SELF-INCRIMINATION

-

SOUND

MOTION PICTURES OF INTOXICATED DRIVER TAKEN WITHOUT CONSENT
SHORTLY AFTER ARREST ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE OVER OBJECTION
THAT THEY VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-

On April 6, 1963, Joe Lanford was arrested and charged
with violating § 13-4-30 of the Colorado Revised Statutes1 for driving under
INCRIMINATION. --

the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was taken to Denver police head-

quarters for further questioning and the administration of sobriety tests. A
sound motion picture film was taken at the police station. This film, taken

without Lanford's consent, showed his refusal to take designated coordination tests. At his trial in the Superior Court of the City and County of
Denver, the motion picture was admitted into evidence. Lanford was found
guilty of driving while intoxicated, sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $200.00
plus costs. On appeal, Lanford argued that introduction of the motion picture
in evidence violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination because it
was taken without his consent and showed his refusal to submit to coordination
tests. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in affirming his conviction, held: moving pictures and their sound, which are relevant and which allegedly show the
demeanor and condition of a defendant charged with driving under the influence
of either alcohol or drugs, taken at the time of arrest or shortly thereafter, are
admissible in evidence even though they show defendant's refusal to take sobriety
and coordination tests, when properly offered to show defendant's demeanor,
conduct, and appearance, and to show why sobriety and coordination tests were
not given. Lanford v. People, 409 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1966).
The litigation of "drunk driving" cases often presents interesting legal
problems. These problems arise out of the nature of the procedures utilized by
law enforcement agencies in gathering evidence to support a conviction for
driving under the influence. In an effort to stem the rising tide of traffic accidents attributable to intoxicated drivers, opinion evidence based upon visual
observations by police officers has taken a back seat to the utilization of a variety
of scientific devices. Modem drunk driving litigation has witnessed the introduction in evidence of the results of such devices as blood tests, urine tests, and a
variety of breath tests, all aimed at establishing intoxication.' The use of these
devices raises important questions as to whether their introduction in evidence
violates a defendant's federal and state constitutional rights. 8
1

COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-4-30 (1953) provides:
Driving under the influence- penalty. - Any person under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or who is a habitual user of narcotic drugs
and who shall drive any vehicle upon any highway within this state, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less
than ten days nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than twenty-five
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment,
if and when found guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction or by a jury.

2 Among the more commonly used scientific methods of substantiating the charge of
driving under the influence of alcohol are "breathilizers," "drunkometers," "alcometers" and
"intoximeters." RICHrARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 13 (1961).
3 The three main constitutional arguments are that the tests violate due process; constitute illegal searches and seizures; and are contrary to the privilege against self-incrimina-

1009

1010

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

For years, law enforcement agencies have sought a simpler means of ascertaining a suspect's intoxication. Such a device would have to strike a proper
balance between the protection of an individual's constitutional rights and the
reasonable needs of law enforcement agencies in protecting the public. A number of cities have seized upon the device of taking sound motion pictures of
suspected intoxicated drivers.' Such motion pictures are then offered in evidence to aid the court in determining whether or not an accused was under
the influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest. It was believed that the exhibition of such motion pictures was the most positive method of supporting an
arresting officer's testimony, consistent with the accused's rights to procedural
fairness. Thus, in Lanford, sound motion pictures were permitted in evidence
to show the demeanor and condition of a defendant charged with driving under
the influence of alcohol.
In general, the basic principles which govern the admissibility of photographs
into evidence apply to motion pictures.5 Hence, when they are relevant, material,
and have been properly authenticated, motion pictures may be received in evidence. Motion pictures have been used as an evidentiary tool in both civil and
criminal trials for a numbr of purposes.6 In keeping with the policy of courts
to enlist every possible aid for the ascertainment of the truth, motion pictures
7
serve a distinct purpose as a "constructive adjunct to the fact-finding process."1
Thus, there would appear to be a sound legal basis, amply supported by precedent, for admitting sound motion pictures of alleged intoxicated drivers in

D.W.I. cases.
However, the particular type of motion pictures introduced in Lanford's
trial for driving under the influence raises peculiar constitutional problems. The
film was taken at the police station shortly after Lanford's arrest. It was taken
tion. Compare Rochin v. 'California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the Supreme Court, on
due process grounds, excluded evidence obtained by a forcefully administered emetic, with
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), where evidence of a blood test taken while a
suspect was unconscious was admitted because such means did not "shock the conscience."
See Goff, Constitutionality Of Compulsory Chemical Tests To Determine Intoxication, 49
J. Ciams. L., C. & P.S. 58 (1958); Roth, Drunk Driving: Selected Problems of Procedural
Due Process, 14 HASTINGs L.J. 399 (1963). The due process and search and seizure problems are beyond the scope of this article and will be discussed only inferentially.
4 E.g., Fresno, California; Waterloo, Iowa; Sioux City, Iowa; San Bernardino, California; and Denver, Colorado (where the instant case arose). Tuttle and Conrad, Motion
Pictures of Intoxicated Drivers, Finger Print and Identification Magazine, April, 1963, p. 3,
at 7.
5 See SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EvImENCE § 624 (1942) and Annot., Use of Motion Pictures
as Evidence, 62 A.L.R.2d 686 (1958).
6 E.g., Civil Cases: Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 2d 544, 348
P.2d 887, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960) (motion picture depicting condition of personal injury
victim) ; McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940), (motion pictures
admissible to discredit the testimony of a personal injury claimant by showing activity inconsistent with alleged injury); Sparks v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 83 So. 2d 453
(La. Ct. App. 1955) (motion picture admissible to show condition of a person, place, object,
or activity). E.g., Criminal Cases: People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321
(1937) (sound motion picture of confession held admissible); People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d
491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948) (sound pictures of re-enactment by defendants of a crime). See 1
CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE

§ 753 (1966 Supp.) for a collection of cases; Tuttle and

Conrad, Motion Pictures of Intoxicated Drivers, Finger Print and Identification Magazine,

April, 1963, p. 3, at 15-17.
7 RICHARDSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 16.23 at 425.
App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937).
8 "Driving while intoxicated."

See People v. Hayes, 21 Cal.
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without his consent and it showed his refusal to submit to requested coordination
tests. Because of these two factors, Lanford asserted that the introduction of
such motion pictures in evidence at his trial violated his constitutional rights
against self-incrimination under both the Colorado Constitution9 and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." The case was one of first
impression in Colorado. In fact, only one other jurisdiction, Texas, had addressed itself to this precise issue." In view of the increasing number of law
enforcement agencies that are adopting this new method for securing convictions
in D.W.I. cases, and in the absence of any general rule as to the constitutional
validity of admitting such motion pictures in evidence, the significance of the
Lanford decision is at once apparent.
The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the only two decisions directly on
point, both of which were decided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
In Housewright v. State," motion pictures of a person charged with driving
while intoxicated were taken while the defendant was being booked at the jail.
These motion pictures were shown to a jury over defendant's objection that he
was being compelled to testify against himself in violation of his constitutional
rights. In affirming his conviction, the Texas court adopted the reasoning of
the ancient maxim that " one picture is worth a thousand words" when it
stated:
Evidently the witnesses could delineate the peculiarities of appellant at
the scene of the alleged offense and his demeanor and actions in order to
give a basis of their opinion as to his intoxicated condition; and it seems
to us to be but a clearer delineation of what they saw and described to the
jury if such a scene could thus be shown by a series of pictures taken
immediately after his apprehension instead of the eyewitnesses testifying
only from memory."
In the other Texas case, Carpenter v. State, 4 the defendant was convicted
of murder in causing the death of a pedestrian while driving in an intoxicated
condition. The court, citing Housewright, held that motion pictures taken of a
defendant charged with being drunk at the time were admissible over the objection that their introduction compelled the defendant to give evidence against
himself. Although the Housewright and Carpenter decisions appear to be on all
fours with the facts in Lanford, there is one significant distinction. In Housewright, the court noted that no objection was made by the defendant at the
time the movies were taken. 5 Carpenter was silent on whether the defendant
objected to the original taking of the movies. 6 Thus, Lanford may be distin9 'CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 18 reads: "No person shall be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal case.. .. "
10 The pertinent part of the fifth amendment reads: "No person . .. shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . - ."
11 Carpenter v. State, 169 Tex. Grim. 283, 333 S.W.2d 391 (1960); Housewright v.
State, 154 Tex. Grim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
12 154 Tex. Grim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
13 225 S.W.2d 417, 418 (1949).
14 169 Tex. Grim. 283, 333 S.W.2d 391 (1960).

15 225 S.W.2d 417, 418 (1949).
16

Lanford v. People, 409 P.2d 829, 831 (Colo. 1966).
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guished by the absence of any consent on the part of the defendant to taking the
motion pictures.
The Colorado Supreme Court rather summarily dismissed Lanford's selfincrimination argument. The court noted that Colorado follows the orthodox
view of Dean Wigmore that the privilege against self-incrimination is specifically
limited to testimonial compulsion.'
The majority of American jurisdictions
adhere to Wigmore's narrow view of the privilege, drawing a distinction between
compulsory testimonial evidence and compulsory physical disclosure. 8 Under
this view, it is held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
does not extend to the exclusion of a defendant's body or his mental condition
as evidence even when such evidence is obtained by compulsion. 9 An accused
may thus be compelled to make disclosure of his bodily condition, features,
measurements, or other characteristics over which he has no power of control.2"
Such evidence as fingerprints, photographs, line-up identification, footprints,
compulsory physical and psychiatric examinations, compulsory voice identification, and compelled exhibition in certain clothes, although they involve the person of the suspect in some manner, are generally held admissible, as non-testimonial evidence.2"
Photographs play a vital role in the identification of an accused. In Shaffer
v. United States,2" a photograph of a person accused of homicide was taken
while he was in custody. The use of this photograph at trial as a means of
identification was held not to violate the accused's constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. The court stated:
It could as well be contended that a prisoner could lawfully refuse to allow
himself to be seen, while in prison, by a witness brought to identify him,
or that he could rightfully refuse to uncover himself, or to remove a mark
[sic], in court, to enable witnesses to identify him as the party accused as
that he could rightfully refuse to allow an officer, in whose custody he
remained, to set an instrument and take his likeness for purposes of proof
and identification. It is one of the usual means employed in the police
service of the country, and it would be matter of regret to have its use
unduly restricted upon any fanciful theory or constitutional privilege. 23
17

18

The history of the privilege . . .-especially
the spirit of the struggle by which its
establishment came about- suggests that the privilege is limited to testimonial
disclosures. It was directed at the employment of legal process to extract from the
person's own lips an admission of guilt, which would thus take the place of other
evidence. That is, it was intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract
from the person a sworn communication of his knowledge of facts which would
incriminate him. Such was the process of the ecclesiastical court. . . . Such was
the complaint of Lilburn....
In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernel
of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial
compulsion. 8 WIsOeRE, EvIDENCE § 2263, at 378-79 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION -WHAT
CAN AN ACCUSED PERSON Bn COMPELLED To

Do? 73 (1950).
19 State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 458, 80 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1954)

and cases cited

therein.
20 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS Or EVIDENCE 158 (1962).
21 See INBAU, op. cit. supra note 18; Mann and Thomas, To What Extent Does The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Protect An Accused From Physical Disclosures?, 1 VAim.

L. REv. 243 (1948).
22
23

24 App. D.C. 417 (1904), cert. denied, 196 U.S. 639 (1905).
Id. at 426. The court meant to use the word, "mask" rather than "mark."
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Thus, photographs taken at a police station at the time of arrest are generally
held to be a permissible part of the routine police identification process upon the
same reasoning applied to fingerprints.24 Extending this rationale a step further,
sound motion pictures might likewise be held to fall outside the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Implicit in the Lanford decision is the court's reluctance to deny itself
the use of photographic evidence in trials of this nature. Motion pictures are
superior substitutes for the verbal testimony of law enforcement officers. Hence,
the Colorado Supreme Court readily analogized the use of motion pictures in
D.W.I. cases to compelling defendants, during a trial for armed robbery, to
have masks placed over their faces in open court to facilitate identification.
Colorado had previously ruled that such a request did not violate an accused's
privilege against self-incrimination, since testimonial compulsion was not involved.25
Although Lanford, in the strict sense, did not provide testimonial utterances
against himself, he did involuntarily furnish evidence against himself, since the
motion pictures of his condition subsequent to arrest were taken under circumstances in which consent was totally lacking. Although the privilege against
self-incrimination has thus far been limited to compulsion to give testimony, there
is some sentiment in favor of a more absolutist view of the privilege which would
extend it to any evidence secured from an accused by compulsion. Under such
a view, the photographing of an individual subsequent to arrest and the recording of his voice in the process might be regarded as violative of the policy
behind the privilege against self-incrimination, on the ground that the compulsory extraction of real evidence from an accused without his consent is as
undesirable as a coerced confession.
In the light of recent Supreme Court decisions, it is unlikely that the Lanford decision would withstand an attack through our federal court system."8
Although the Supreme Court has in the past adhered to Wigmore's strict view
of the privilege,2" Justices Black and Douglas have argued for an absolutist view
of the privilege, extending it to all manner of incriminating evidence."a This
broader, more liberal interpretation of the privilege would make "compulsion"
the essence of the privilege. Thus, any time an accused is compelled to furnish
24 United States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596, 599 (3d Cir. 1948).
25 Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 129, 300 P.2d 545, 547 (1956).
26 This opinion was expressed by Lanford's counsel, M. Keith Singer in a letter to the
No=R DAME LAWYER, March 31, 1966, on file in the office of the NOTRE DAME LAwYER.
However, no appeal was taken in the instant case.
27 E.g., in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), it was held that forcing a
suspect to try on a bloody shirt to see if it fits did not violate his right against self-incrimination. Justice Holmes stated: "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence ... ." Id. at 252-53.
28 In their dissenting remarks in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), Justices

Black and Douglas stated that they would not
draw a line between involuntary extractions of words from

. . . [a suspect's] lips,
the involuntary extraction of the contents of his stomach, and the involuntary

extraction of fluids of his body when the evidence obtained is used to convict him.

Under our system of government, police cannot compel people to furnish the

evidence necessary to send them to prison.
Id. at 443.
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any evidence which might aid in establishing his guilt, this amounts to a violation of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."
A review of United States Supreme Court decisions during the past few
years reveals significant changes in the Court's attitude toward the rights of a
criminal defendant in a state court proceeding. Especially significant is the
Court's opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois'° in which the Court held that when the
process of police investigation shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage- when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession
where the suspect has been taken into police custody, and the police carry
out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the police must effectively warn the suspect of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent. If this is not done, no statement elicited by the police during
the interrogation may be used against the accused at a criminal trial. Following
the Escobedo rationale, all drunk drivers are immediately suspected when they
are arrested while in an allegedly intoxicated condition. When sound motion
pictures are taken of a suspect at the police station, without his consent, such
movies are more than a mere part of the identification process. Because of the
hybrid character of sound movies, statements made by an accused and recorded
on the sound track of a motion picture camera are orally incriminating evidence
tantamount to a confession. Statements made at the police station will come
back to haunt an accused at his trial. In such a case, a defendant has been
forced, without his consent, to give evidence that will be used against him at a
later proceeding before he has been apprised of his constitutional privilege not
to say anything that will incriminate him. Since the obvious purpose of photographing drunk drivers is to elicit incriminating evidence of both an oral" and
visual nature, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow sound motion
pictures in evidence should they have occasion to re-examine the privilege against
self-incrimination in a case such as Lanford. Thus, two recent commentators
have stated:
It is quite evident to us that the Wigmorian orthodox view of the
privilege against self-incrimination will in the future be closely re-examined by the United States Supreme Court and that nontestimonial compulsion, through the use of finger printing and photography, may undergo
a great change beginning at the moment when the accused becomes a
suspect, rather than at the moment he is arrested. Identification people
must prepare for such eventuality.2
See Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940). Cf. Chief
29
Justice Belt's dissenting remarks in State v. Gram, 176 Ore. 577, 604-05, 160 P.2d 283, 293
(1945).
30 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
31 In People v. Young, 224 Cal. App. 2d 420, 36 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1964) a tape recording
of conversations had with defendant, accused of manslaughter in driving a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, was held to have been properly admitted in evidence to establish defendant's
alleged intoxicated condition at the time of the accident, through the tone, pronunciation,
and slurred speech of defendant's statements.
32 Tuttle and Conrad, More On Filming Persons Arrested For Driving While Intoxicated,
Finger Print and Identification Magazine, September, 1965, p. 3, at 14. The authors suggest:
As to future drunken driving movies, the law enforcement people should inform
the accused that:
1. He has a right to secure counsel immediately.
2. He has a constitutional privilege not to say anything that will incriminate
him.
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That state courts are prepared to reach this result is evident in State v.
Merrow," where the Supreme Court of Maine held that the failure of the trial
court to make a finding of fact as to the voluntariness of defendant's consent
to the taking of a blood sample before submitting the question to the jury was
reversible error. The court stated that
Under the circumstances . . . the voluntariness of a confession and the
rules of trial procedure pertaining to the finding of the element of voluntariness are analogous to the question of voluntary consent in cases prosecuted under the statute prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles while
intoxicated. 4
Still another recent Supreme Court decision re-examining the scope of the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination casts considerable doubt
upon the decision reached in Lanford. Colorado law does not make it mandatory for a person to submit to any chemical tests for intoxication."5 However,
some jurisdictions have held that it is permissible to introduce evidence of a
defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test because such refusal relates to his conduct, demeanor, statements, attitude, and relation to the crime charged."6 The
Colorado court noted that in the states which follow this rule, an analogy is
drawn between the admissibility of a defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test
and the right in the particular state to comment on a defendant's failure to
testify."7 However, the Supreme Court has recently held in Griffin v. California,38 that a state rule permitting comment on a defendant's failure to testify
in a criminal trial violates the privilege against self-incrimination. This decision
followed the lead of Malloy v. Hogan,9 decided a year earlier, which held that
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is one of those rights
protected against state infringement by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The rationale of the Griffin decision is thus inconsistent with the
reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court that sound motion pictures which
show the demeanor and condition of a defendant charged with driving under
the influence of alcohol, taken at the time of arrest or soon thereafter, are

33

3. Whatever he says may or may not be used against him in the same or
subsequent proceedings.
It is our suggestion that all of these warnings be recorded both on the film
and the sound track. Ibid.
208 A.2d 659 (Me. 1965).

34 Id. at 661.

35 COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-5-30 (3) (1963).
36 E.g., State v. Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Dela. 1963); State v. Nutt, 78 Ohio App. 336,
65 N.E.2d 675 (1946).
Other states forbid testimony relating to refusal to take the tests. Such evidence is held
to constitute reversible error. See e.g., People v. Knutson, 17 InI. App.2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461
(1958); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. Crim. 1957).
It is interesting to note that although Texas allows sound motion pictures of intoxicated
drivers to be admitted in evidence, the same Texas court has held that it is reversible error
to introduce evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test. Cardwell v. State,
156 Tex. Grim. 457, 243 S.W.2d 702 (1951). Thus, Texas has drawn a line between the use
of movies alone as an evidentiary tool and the use of testimony showing the refusal to take
sobriety tests. The Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged this distinction but failed to follow
Texas' practice.
37 Lanford v. People, 409 P.2d 829, 831-32 (Colo. 1966).
38 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
39 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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admissible in evidence even though they show the defendant's refusal to take
sobriety and coordination tests.
In the final analysis, the problem resolves itself into a matter of striking a
proper balance between the protection of an individual's constitutional rights
and the reasonable needs of law enforcement agencies to protect the public
against the menace of intoxicated drivers. It can be argued that an absolute
prohibition of the use of sound motion pictures would severely and unrealistically impede a court in its fact-finding process. The value of sound motion
pictures to law enforcement agencies cannot be underestimated. Conviction
rates soar4" while court costs plunge4' in jurisdictions which use sound movies
as an evidentiary tool in driving while intoxicated cases. It is further contended
that such evidence, while valuable to the prosecution, is just as helpful to the
defendant.4 2 Persuasive arguments can thus be made that sound motion pictures of intoxicated drivers are the fairest, most economical way of presenting a
jury with a record of the condition and behavior of a person as well as his
ability to drive a car at the time of his arrest.43

Counterbalancing these arguments as to the obvious value of sound motion
pictures to law enforcement agencies are considerations of an individual's constitutional right not to be compelled to give incriminating evidence against himself. The privilege against self-incrimination reflects our preference for an accusatorial-adversary system as opposed to an inquisitorial system." Documentary
evidence has made significant inroads on the privilege against self-incrimination.
However, it is doubtful that the United States Supreme Court will allow sound
motion pictures of an intoxicated driver, taken at a police station shortly after
arrest, to be admitted into evidence at his trial unless the procedure was attended
with significant safeguards. Procedural due process achieved new dimensions
with the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo. In all significant respects, Joe
Lanford was in the same position as was Danny Escobedo. Since the demeanor
of an alleged intoxicated driver is so inextricably an element of the offense
charged, Lanford should not have been compelled to give any incriminating
evidence against himself prior to his being apprised of his right to secure counsel
40 In all of the cities where motion pictures are being made in driving while intoxicated
cases, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of convictions which have been
obtained. In Denver, the conviction rate jumped from 65% the year before sound motion
pictures were instituted to 93.7% four years later. The rate of guilty pleas went from an
anemic 27% to 84.3% in the same time. Tuttle and Conrad, Motion Pictures of Intoxicated
Drivers, Finger Print and Identification Magazine, April, 1963, p. 3, at 11.
41 Id. at 8. In the vast majority of the cases where such movies have been taken, the
defendant is allowed to view them prior to trial. "Nine times out of ten, the sight of himself
wobbling through the tests is enough to convince the driver that he ought to plead guilty."
Time, Nov. 22, 1963, p. 61. This results in saving the cost of trial and several adjournments,
all to the savings of the taxpayer.
42 A Municipal Court Judge from Sioux City, Iowa, reported:
It is the opinion of this Court that the use of sound motion pictures in the trial
of OMVI [operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated] cases has been one of the
greatest advancements made in obtaining justice for a defendant. While it is true
that some cases have been lost because the picture did not convince the jury that
the man was intoxicated; this is, nevertheless, justice in its truest sense.
Tuttle and Conrad, Motion Pictures of Intoxicated Drivers, Finger Print and
Identification Magazine, April, 1963, p. 3 at 13.
43 Id. at 7.
44 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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and remain silent. It is to be hoped that law enforcement agencies in the future
will use sound motion pictures of suspects in driving while intoxicated cases in a
manner consistent with the teachings of Escobedo. Once the requisites of procedural due process have been satisfied, there is no reason why the camera may
not then roll.
Stephen R. Lamantia
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EVIDENCE - FEDERAL RULE PROHIBITING USE
OF "MERE EVIDENCE" Is NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND CALIFORNIA
MAY ALLOW SEARCH, SEIZURE AND USE IN EVIDENCE OF PHYSICIAN'S OFFICE

RECORDS. -A physician and his office assistant were convicted of submitting
false and fraudulent claims for medical services rendered to those whose medical
care was paid-for by the Bureau of Public Assistance and of conspiracy to submit such claims. For each patient, the doctor submitted a "medical care statement," certifying the performance of services and seeking his payment. The
state sought to prove billing for unperformed services and for services charged
to others. It introduced into evidence both the "medical care statements" and
corresponding medical care records taken from the doctor's files under a search
warrant. When compared, the cards from the doctor's files indicated fewer visits
or different treatments from those shown on the cards submitted to the Bureau.
The doctor's employees testified that these were the cards used to prepare the
records for the Bureau of Public Assistance and that Dr. Thayer had instructed
them to bill for non-rendered services. Dr. Thayer, insisting that the records
were not contraband, instruments, or fruits of a crime, contended that the medical statements taken from his files were "mere evidence" of the commission of
a crime. He claimed protection under the fourth and fifth amendments as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
On appeal by the state, the California Supreme Court reversed, vacated the
opinion of the court of appeal, and held: the federal rule prohibiting the seizure
of "mere evidence" is not a constitutional standard and the records were properly
seized in accord with the California statute permitting such seizure. Even if
the "mere evidence" rule were a constitutional standard, it would not require the
exclusion of these records since they were instrumentalities of a crime. People
v. Thayer, 47 Cal.Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1965).
Chief Justice Traynor had dual aims in People v. Thayer: to establish "mere
evidence" as an object of lawful search and, consequently, an admissible object
at trial; and, to demonstrate the conflict between the California statute which
allows the seizure of "mere evidence" and the federal rule which prevents it as
an example of the differing approaches to evidence problems that have developed
in our federal system.' The underlying question was the same resolved in Mapp
1
2

People v. Thayer, 47 Cal.Rptr. 780, 781, 408 P.2d 108, 109 (1965).
Chief Justice Traynor previously examined this problem in Mapp v. Ohio At Large

In The Fifty States, 1962 Duxn L. J. 319. He surveyed the federal rule excluding objects
of mere evidentiary value and found only "explanations in the dark." He concluded "should
any state court in its right mind risk losing it in the pursuit of learning whatever the total
message is of a federal rule of such elaborate obfuscation?" He believed "freedom from
entangling alliances with confusing federal rules that have no clear constitutional basis" is
by far the preferable approach. Id. at 330, 331.
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v. Ohio:' to what extent and in what circumstances are interpretations of federal
constitutional guarantees mandatory upon a state court in a similar situation?
How free are states to develop their own rules of evidence where they touch upon
the Bill of Rights?4
The rule prohibiting searches for "mere evidence" was most clearly enunciated in Gouled v. United States.5 Gouled was convicted of conspiring and
defrauding the United States by means of contracts to furnish clothing for the
Army. Under a search warrant, the Government seized an unexecuted form of a
contract, a written contract and an attorney's bill. This evidence was excluded
and the conviction reversed. The Supreme Court held:
[T]hey [search warrants] may not be used as a means of gaining access
to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal
proceeding, but ... may be resorted to only when a primary right to such
search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the
complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may
be taken."
The rule, thus established, requires that a man's private papers, unless they are
stolen property or were used to commit a crime, cannot be taken by search warrant. They are "mere evidence" of an event which the state may attempt to prove
was a crime. Explanations and evaluations of this rule are, at best, divergent.'
The Constitution of the United States is the foundation of the rule that
"mere evidence" is not a proper object of search and seizure. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
The fifth amendment, in part, provides: "No person . .. shall be compelled in
3 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 See Colings, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-An Amicus Curiae
Brief, 50 CAL. L. Rzv. 421 (1962) (contending that states should be free to develop their
own rules governing the exclusion of evidence).
5 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
6 Id. at 309.
7

See, e.g., MAGUmnR,

EvrDEcE oF GUILT §

5.04, at 183

(1959)

where he briefly

treats the rule, finding its justification on "obscuredly implied grounds"; 8 WrGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2184a at 45 (McNaughton rev. 1961) follows Wigmore's classification of the rule as
"unfortunate"; Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CAL.
L. REv. 474, 477-479 (1961); Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and SeizureA Second Class Constitutional Right? 25 IND. L. J. 259 (1950) (an excellent treatment of
the rule as it fits into the historical development of search and seizure rules); Shellow, The
Continuing Validity Of The Gouled Rule: The Search For And Seizure Of Evidence 48
MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964) (traces developments in recent federal cases); Comment, Limitations On Seizure Of "Evidentiary" Objects, A Rule In Search Of A Reason 20 U. CHI. L.
Rlv. 319 (1953) (probes the rationale of the rule); Constitutional Problems In The Administration Of Criminal Law-Search And Seizure, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 611, 624-628 (1964)
(deals with the rules' application in light of recent Supreme Court cases).

RECENT DECISIONS

1019

any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " Iis important to understand the dual protection of the fourth amendment. The first is its protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures; the second is the requirements which
a valid search warrant must meet. This dual protection was the product of a
deliberate plan to afford additional protection against a search and seizure that,
even though authorized by warrant, was unreasonable.8 The meaning of "reasonable" has been the source of both prolific and prolix comment, and has been
the ambiguous term around which many a search problem has flared.9 Where
the subject of a search is a man's private papers, the unreasonable searches prohibited by the fourth amendment are defined in terms of the fifth amendment's
protection against self-incrimination. In "the great case of Boyd v. United
States,"'" the Supreme Court, defining the objects of seizure, examined this
relationship and found that the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into
each other."'"
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two Amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable
searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment...
[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against'himself.12
Reasonableness thus excludes self-incriminatory matter; seizures that would take
a man's private books to be used in evidence against him are unreasonable. In
Boyd,' the Court first studied James Otis' struggle against writs of assistance, the
tools used by colonial revenue officers to conduct general searches for smuggled
goods.' 4 It also discussed the infamous general warrant used to search for sedi8 See Reynard, supra note 7 at 275-277. The author examines the debates on the
fourth amendment and relates how Mr. Benson, substituting a draft the House had rejected,
wrote a protection into the Constitution that had not been planned. He concludes "the
Amendmenes first clause prohibits a search for mere evidence even though the warrant
authorizing it be valid." Id. at 276.
9 See Collings, supra note 4. Areas in which an element of reasonableness is part of the
consideration include investigation, search prior to arrest, incident to arrest, and without
a warrant. He says: "In my opinion, it would be impossible for the Supreme Court to lay
down meaningful uniform standards of reasonable cause." Id. at 429-30. Search And Seizure
In The Supreme Court: Shadows On The Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 664

(1961).

10 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Mr. Justice Brennan in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
11 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
12 Id. at 633. This view has been severely criticized as being an incorrect analysis of
history. WiGmoa, op. cit. supra note 7, at 381-84; MAGU=R, op. Cit. supra note 7 at 182.
Maguire introduces his analysis by saying "Historically, the confusion is indefensible. Functionally, it has partial justification." But see Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960).
"This has been said to be erroneous history; if it was, it was even less than a harmless error;
it was part of the process through which the Fourth Amendment, by means of the exclusionary
rule, has become more than a dead letter in the federal courts." Brennan, J. dissenting.
13 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd involved an action to compel the production of an invoice
for cases of glass where it was contended the customs laws had been violated. If the invoice
was not produced, the evidence sought would be deemed confessed. This was, pursuant to a
procedure authorized by an Act of Congress in revenue investigations. The Supreme Court held
the Act of Congress unconstitutional. The great hesitancy of the Court to hold that a coordinate branch of government has exceeded the mandate of the Constitution amply demonstrates that it did not forbid the seizure of a man's papers for light or transient reasons. It
was on this foundation, the protection against seizure of private papers, that Gouled built.
14 Paxton's Case, Quincy Rpts. 51 (Mass. 1761).
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tious libel. 5 Justice Bradley, in Boyd, then turned to Entick v. Carrington,6
the fountainhead of freedom from searches through a man's private papers.
Entick sued the King's messengers in trespass for breaking into his quarters where
they broke open his boxes and seized his papers. His offense had been to author
an unlicensed book, sufficient in that day to be seditious libel. The messengers
asserted Lord Halifax's warrant as a complete defense. Lord Camden's judgment, forbidding the search, gives the theoretical basis of the protection against
such seizures:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection....
• . [I]t is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a
means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases
had been shewn, where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's custody
by process. There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has been
often tried, but never prevailed....
...[O]ur law has provided no paper-search in these cases [murder, rape
or robbery -more atrocious than libeling] to help forward the conviction.' 7
Lord Camden's justification for this prohibition retains its validity into our own
day:
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because
the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should
seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There
too the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.
Observe the wisdom as well as mercy of the law. The strongest evidence before a trial, being only ex parte, is but suspicion; it is not proof.'
Property is the foundation of the right; but the rationalization, the enduring
validity, is found in man's protection against self-accusation. The policy of the
law designedly prevents the guilty man from being convicted out of his own
mouth. Consequently, coerced confessions have no place in our system. However, the protection afforded also reflects an equally sacred principle -a
man
is innocent until proven guilty. To take a man's private books assumes they are
forfeit because they have been used to commit a crime. Yet they are taken for
the sole purpose of prosecuting him to prove this guilt. In this respect, they
differ from stolen property or items like guns or knives designedly used in the
commission of crime. If he is innocent, his books were not used to commit a
crime; if he is guilty, their use to commit a crime is evident only after the verdict.
15 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (1763). Lest it be thought the general warrant
had joined the Star Chamber in limbo, Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), showed it
is still a possible threat to liberty. A search warrant had issued for "books, records, pamphlets,
cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning
the Communist Party of Texas." Id. at 477-478. The investigators took 14 cartons of innocent
books and papers including a speech by Pope John XXIII and a dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Black. The Court held it a "general warrant." Id. at 480, and ordered the return
of the books.
16 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
17 Id. at 1066, 1073.
18 Id. at 1073.
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They cannot be used to prove the assumption under which they are taken.' "
Having thus reviewed history, Justice Bradley gave judgment in Boyd and
established the rule that governs in federal courts:
The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick] affect the very essence
of constitutional liberty and security.... Whey apply to all invasions, on
the part of the Government and its employees, of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the
rummaging of his drawers that constitute the essence of the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property.. . . [Ilt is the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own
testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
20 to convict him of
crime.., is within the condemnation of that judgment.

Personal liberty and security are violated by an invasion of a man's home to
obtain his personal papers; the rationalization of this protection is freedom from
compulsory self-accusation.
What is the scope of the protection afforded by this combination of freedom from unreasonable searches and freedom from self-accusation? Gouled
v. United States1 provided the answer for federal courts. In order to delineate
that which is "mere evidence," the Court addressed itself to the permissible
objects of a search and seizure:
[A]t the time the Constitution was adopted stolen or forfeited property, or

property liable to duties and concealed to avoid payment of them, excisable
articles and books required by law to be kept with respect to them, counterfeit coin, burglars' tools and weapons, implements of gambling "and many
other things of like character" might be searched for in home or office and
if found might be seized .... 22

These have been denominated the instrumentalities of crime and may be taken,
even from the privacy of a home. The Court addressed itself to the distinguishing factor that made the "mere evidence" - a contract and an attorney's bill
- immune from seizure while the instrumentalities were a proper object of search.
Instrumentalities may be "seized for the purpose of preventing further frauds."2
19 Lest it be thought that this view exalts logic so that it contradicts experience and
unduly restricts the police, it should be understood that the underlying premise behind the
"mere evidence" rule is one limiting it to a man's intellectual products, wholly inapplicable
to the physical objects usually seized. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
20 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

21 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
22 Id. at 308. See FED. R. Cram. P. 41(b):

23

Grounds for Issuance. A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and
seize any property
(1)
Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(2)
Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means
of committing a criminal offense; or
(3)
Possessed, controlled or designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. 957. [Property used in aid of a foreign
government.]
Id. at 309.
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The rationale is: that may be seized in which a man never had a right to possession as stolen property or the fruit of a crime; and, that may be seized in which
a man has forfeited his right to possession because he intends to use it to commit
future crime. Any other item is "mere evidence" of the commission of a past
crime and cannot be seized when it is found among a man's private books and
papers.
Federal cases have not been consistent. The problem is not with the
admission of "mere evidence"; this has never been allowed. Rather, the difficulty arises in affixing either the "mere evidence" or the "instrumentality" label
to an item. To the extent courts are willing to place the instrumentality
'
label on an item, the practice "saps it [the rule] of all vitality."24
The cases
disclose the problem. Marron v. United States" followed Gouled and seemed to
open the door to labelling any item an instrumentality. In Marron, a search
warrant was obtained and a raid made on a building in which bootleggers were
operating a speakeasy. From a closet and drawers, the revenue agents took bills
for gas, electric lights and telephone services as well as a ledger used to record
sales. The court placed these items in the instrumentality category, holding
"they were convenient, if not in fact necessary, for the keeping of the accounts;
and, as they were so closely related to the business, it is not unreasonable to
consider them as used to carry it on."26 The next case, Go-Bart Co. v. United
States,27 took the opposite approach. In another speakeasy case, agents forced
an employee to open a desk and safe, seizing keys, papers, and books. Emphasizing that no conspiracy was taking place in the officers' presence, the court said
"it was a lawless invasion of premises and a general exploratory search in the
hope that evidence of crime might be found."'
United States v. Lefkowitz"9
gave force and vitality to the rule announced in Gouled. Bootleggers were the
subject of a lawful arrest in their establishment. Their office, including desks
and wastebaskets, was searched and bills and papers seized. The Court distinguished the Marron case as involving the seizure of items in plain viewalthough a closet was searched- whereas "here, the searches were exploratory
and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt of the alleged
conspiracy or some other crime. 30 The "mere evidence" rule was stated in its
full vigor:
Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence
of crime of which respondents were accused or suspected. They could
not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search warrant issued
upon ample evidence and
precisely describing such things and disclosing
31
exactly where they were.
Since 1946, the Court seems more willing to classify an object as an instru24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

People v. Thayer, 47 Cal.Rptr. 780, 784, 408 P.2d 108, 112 (1965).
275 U.S. 192 (1927).
Id. at 199.
282 U.S. 344 (1931).
Id. at 358.
285 U.S. 452 (1932).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 464.
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Davis v. United States"2 involved

an arrest without a warrant of one selling gasoline without collecting rationing
coupons. A search was made of the office and rationing coupons were found.
These were not "mere evidence" as "we are dealing here not with private papers
or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private
property of the holder but remained at all times the property of the Govern3 Zap v. United States3
ment and subject to inspection and recall by it.1"3
seemed to minimize the significance of the "mere evidence' rule and to exalt
the instrumentality exception beyond all proportion. The F. B. I., auditing the
books of one performing under government contract, requested and received a
cancelled check that proved the government had been defrauded. The Court
first noted that while there might have been an unlawful seizure of this evidence,
there may have been a waiver since specific permission had been given to make
this audit. Nevertheless, the Court said that "a warrant for it could have been
immediately issued" 5 for the check and footnoted to the statute permitting
seizure of that which is.a means of committing a felony. Frankfurter, dissenting,
upheld the "mere evidence" rule. The legality of the search did 'not legalize
the seizure; and, he said "[to] seize for evidentiary use papers the possession
of which involves no infringement of the law, is a horse of a different color." 6
In Harris v. United States,3a, a search warrant was issued for checks and other
instrumentalities used to defraud an oil company. Pursuant to arrest, a search
was made for these items. They were not found, but stolen draft cards were
discovered and seized. The Court again adhered to instrumentality reasoning'

Clearly the checks and other means and instrumentalities of the crimes
charged in the warrants toward which the search was directed as well as
the draft cards which were in fact seized fall within that class of objects
properly subject to seizure. Certainly this is not a case of search for or
seizure of an individual's private papers, nor does it involve a prosecution
based upon the expression of political or religious views in such papers.'
The draft, cards were found to be items that remain government property. The
latest Supreme Court case on point is one, by its nature, susceptible of making
bad law. In a prosecution for conspiracy to commit espionage, Abel v. United
States3 9 faced the problem of classifying forged birth certificates, graph papecontaining a coded message, a hollowed out pencil, and a block of wood containing a cipher pad. All the seized articles were held to be either items aiding
the commission of espionage or abandoned articles properly the subject of seizure.
Dipping into lower federal court cases, one finds like confusion over the
meaning of "means of committing the crime" and "instrumentality" as con32 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
33 Id. at 588. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, listed permissible objects of search in an
appendix at 618-620.

34

328 U.S. 624 (1946).

35

Id. at 629.

36 Id. at 632-633.
37 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
38

Id. at 154.

39

362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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trasted with "mere evidence." Matthews v. Correa' allowed seizure of seven
address books and an account book of a bankrupt charged with concealing expenditures. The court recognized that it was difficult to distinguish between
the "fruit of the crime" and "mere evidence" and suggested that the distinction
turn "on the good faith of the search [rather] than the actual distinctions between
the matters turned up." 1 In any event, "the articles in question are more than
evidential; they are the very things withheld." 42 Yet, in a search incident to
an arrest on a charge of harboring a fugitive, correspondence and papers including an address book, bills, photographs and an identification bracelet were held
to be "merely evidentiary materials tending to connect the defendant with the
crime for which he was arrested."'" Following an arrest in an international
conspiracy to import narcotics, money that might be used for travel and an
airline ticket were found seizable as the means of committing a crime.4 ' In a
case where receipts of prostitutes' earnings were seized, they were held to be
instrumentalities despite the dissent's remarks that "being merely records of illicit
activities, and not the means by which they were done, these receipts are distinctly outside the category of items the law permits to be seized." 4 A case
that has been criticized as "an example of the application of the means and
instrumentalities rule at its worst"'4 is United States v. Loft on 6th Floor of
Building, etc.Y' There, suppression was ordered of obscene materials as "the
material sought to be seized under the warrant here was not the means of committing the crime of conspiracy.., the affidavit stated that the property was
intended for use in a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged. That is very
different from use as the means of committing the crime."'" United States v.
Stern 9 involved a seizure incident to a lawful arrest on the charge of conspiracy
to defraud the United States by falsifying and concealing material facts so that
income tax was uncollectable. Various records were seized as well as a diary
and notes on meetings. The court recognized that the distinctions between means
of committing a crime and evidence of the crime are difficult and suggested a
test of significance: "Although it is not necessary that the crime alleged could
not have been committed but for the use of the articles seized, after a consideration of all the circumstances it must appear that the article played a significant
role in the commission of the crime alleged." 50 The court excluded both the
diaries and the notes of a meeting, but handwritten sheets containing information on the taxpayer's cost of living were admitted as "this form is the very document by which a revenue agent [the defendant] would falsely represent to the
Government that the taxes were uncollectable."'"
40 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943).
41 Id. at 537.
42 Ibid.
43 United States v. Lerner, 100 F.Supp. 765, 768 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
44 United States v. Pardo-Balland, 229 F.Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd., 348 F.2d
316 (2d Cir. 1965).

45 United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 98 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844
(1962).
46 Kaplan, supra note 7, at 478.
47 182 F.Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
48 Id. at 324-325.
49 225 F.Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50 Id. at 192.
51 Id. at 193.
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State experience with the "mere evidence" rule has been divergent. California, New York, Illinois, and Oregon have legislated to permit the seizure
of "mere evidence," but statutory application has not been uniform. People v.
Thayer applies California's statute52 to violate the protection of a man's papers
which lies behind the rule whereas New York and New Jersey have used their
statutes to reach objects outside the rule's protection. Florida correctly applied
the rule to exclude private papers from search and Texas reached a like result.
However, Texas later fell into an excessively broad application by improperly
excluding physical objects which were not private papers. Kentucky, in contrast, properly admitted like evidence. The Oregon experience illustrates how
the problem develops. In a rape case, the Oregon supreme court, relying on
Gouled, indicated that, in the future, items of "mere evidence" like beer bottles,
bed sheets and pictures would not be admitted. In response to this decision,
the Oregon legislature added to its laws a section allowing the seizure of property
53
which would constitute "evidence of a crime.1
It should not be supposed that such statutes necessarily violate the constitutional protection which the "mere evidence" rule expresses. The New York
and New Jersey applications should clearly be allowed. In New York, a shotgun and shells used in a murder were allowed in evidence despite a claim that
they were in the "mere evidence" category. The court said: "It is clearly within
the competence of the Legislature, under the state's police power, to extend
the right of search and seizure to 'property constituting evidence of crime or
tending to show that a particular person committed a crime.' "" In New Jersey,
55 provoked a similar
State v. Bisacida
response. There, a search with a warrant
was made for shoes with distinctive heels connecting the wearer with the scene
of a murder. The court was satisfied that the shoes were not "mere evidence"
and explored the various theories used to explain the law of search and seizure.
Most center around a property rationale and allow seizure of that in which a
person has no property right. This is because the seized goods were stolen or
were used to commit a crime. It properly rejected such theories. "The property
thesis cannot explain government's authority to search. We know that what is
seized is in fact taken primarily to be used against the accused rather than to
deprive him of some property.""8 Moreover, the entire rationale of the "fruit
52

CAL. PENAL CODE §

1524 (Supp. 1965). "A search warrant may be issued upon any

of the following grounds: . . . (4) When the property or things to be seized consist of any
item or constitute any evidence which tends to show a felony has been committed, or tends
to show that a particular person has committed a felony."
A critical comment claiming that the statute "would appear to be prima facie unconstitutional" if construed to allow the seizure of "mere evidence" appeared after recent Supreme
Court decisions making the protections of the fourth and fifth amendments applicable to the
states. Note, 2 SAN DinGo L. REv. 101, 111 (1965). See ILL. R.EV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-1(d)

(1964).

53 The case was State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962). The amended statute
was OR. REv. STAT. § 141.010 (1961). The addition allowed a search warrant to issue
"(2) when the property was used in the commission of, or which would constitute evidence
of, the crime." A comment, 43 ORE. L. R.Ev. 333 (1964), thought such a statute, in light
of the federal decisions, unconstitutional.
54 People v. Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 632, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
The statute is N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. P. § 792.
55 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965).
56 Id. at 508, 213 A.2d 185, 187 (1965). The New Jersey seizure was made under a
rule of its supreme court. R.R. 3:2A-2(c).
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of the crime" theory breaks down when it is realized that for it to be the "fruit"
would "frequently depend upon the outcome of the very proceeding in which
it is offered to prove guilt."5 New Jersey would, however, not be ready to admit
all objects against which the -"mere evidence" objection would lie. It recognized its proper sphere of operation is in the protection afforded private papers,
and recalled the condemnation and its limits as announced by Mr. Justice
Bradley and Lord Camden: "What they denounced . . . was a search among
private papers, and this because of the extraordinary regard the law has for
the privacy that reposes in them. '' rs Building its decision on this same foundation - the protection afforded a man's private papers - Florida in State v.
Willard59 reached a correct result. The case involved a search pursuant to a
warrant for "private books and records 'for use as evidence.' "60 The inquiry
was one into gambling, and on the basis of the records and books obtained, the
grand jury returned an indictment charging violation of the gambling laws.
Citing Gouled, the court held: "an accused cannot be required to produce a
document for use as evidence against himself that is not in his possession unlawfully."61 It excluded the seized evidence as it was not within the category of
contraband nor were the records required by law to be kept. A combined reading of the fourth and fifth amendments led to the decision to exclude the evidence. There is "no essential difference, in principle, in forcing an accused to
speak against himself or produce records, and in forcing, by an unlawful search
the contents of his home or premises to give evidence against himself."62
Texas also correctly applied the "mere evidence" rule to protect a man's
private papers when in Cagle v. State"s it excluded from evidence a book containing social security numbers seized in a gambling raid. The court concluded
that it could only be used as mere evidence and was not part of the operation
or development of a policy game. The later case of LaRue v. State" is an
example of a mechanical application giving protection from seizure to items
totally unconnected with the security afforded private papers. LaRue excluded
from evidence blood stained clothing and grease stained pants which connected
a suspect with the murder victim on the theory that the items were merely
evidence. Kentucky, in a case were the defendant's pants and shoes had traces
of insulation from a stolen safe, properly rejected such a mechanical broadening
and saw no reason to exclude the items merely because they were the property
of the accused."
As Chief Justice Traynor recognized in People v. Thayer, there are inconsistencies in the federal practice and discordant approaches among the states.
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 514, 213 A.2d 185, 190 (1965).
But see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921), "there is no special sanctity in papers." Id. at 309.
59 54 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1951).
60 Id. at 180.
61 Id. at 182.
62 Ibid.
63 147 Tex. Grim. 354, 180 S.W.2d 928 (1944).
64 149 Tex. Crim. 598, 197 S.W.2d 570 (1946).
65 Boles v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 216, 200 S.W.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1947). But see
Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958) where a handkerchief of a victim
of perversion was held not an instrumentality of the crime and, since evidentiary only, inadmissible.
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But the conflict is more appareait than real. Four classes of evidence illustrate
the problem. (1) Stolen property- there is no problem in its seizure. (2) Instrumentalities of or the means of committing a crime- likewise no problem
has arisen here. (3) "Mere evidence" of a crime in the form of beer bottles,
shotgun shells, shoes, blood stained clothing, and a handkerchief used in perversion. It is arguable that Federal Rule of. Criminal Procedure 41(b)6"
requires federal courts to exclude such evidence. Prescinding from rationalizations and justifications of such an approach, such a protectiorf would be required
by no provision in the Constitution. The federal rule would have its authorization in the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over the inferior federal
courts. Further, it is submitted that such an interpretation is unnecessary and
undesirable. The necessities and practicalities of efficient law enforcement preclude such an approach. (4) "Mere evidence" of a crime found in the form of
a man's private books and papers. This last class of items rightly should receive
the fourth amendment's protection from unreasonable searches declared by Boyd
to be within the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination. Writing
is essentially speech; both are the intellectual product of man. For purposes of
self-incrimination, it matters little whether the idea is expressed orally or through
the medium of paper. The essential element is the turning of a man's thought
into the vehicle of self-accusation. This is the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Consequently, the result reached in People v. Thayer incorrectly analyzes the
constitutional protection of the fourth and fifth amendments and essentially
requires compulsory self-incrimination.
Chief Justice Traynor used People v. Thayer to illustrate the previously
foreseen conflict 67 between federal and state rules where pre-Mapp decisions
had arguably placed the federal rule on a constitutional foundation. He rightly
contends that it had not been foreseen at the time that federal interpretations
of the Bill of Rights would be applicable to the states. It is, however, submitted that his contention that the "mere evidence" rule is not of constitutional
dignity cannot be sustained. When limited to the protection of a man's private
books and papers, the guarantee against seizure of "mere evidence" is one
applicable to the states both under the standard test of a protection "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,"6 9 and also because the protections of the
fourth and fifth amendments here involved have, in recent decisions, specifically
been held applicable to the states.
Boyd traced the interaction of the fourth and fifth amendments as the source
of a right to freedom from search for one's personal papers. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated his view of the principle: "Private papers of an accused cannot
be seized even through legal process because their use would violate the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination." 7 The importance of
this protection is constantly re-emphasized:
66 See note 22 supra.
67 See note 2 supra.
68 People v. Thayer, 47 Cal.Rptr. 780, 782, 408 P.2d 108, 110 (1965).
69 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See the opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlen in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-409 (1965) where he discusses the difference
between the two approaches.
70 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 595 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
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[H]istory makes plain, that it was on the issue of the right to be secure from
searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions
. . . that the
71
great battle for fundamental liberty was fought.

Yet the full fruition of these protections has only recently been realized after
having traveled a rocky road. In Weeks v.United States,7 2 the use of unlawfully
seized evidence was declared prohibited in federal prosecutions. Wolf v. Colorado71 warned the states not to use such evidence and Mapp v. Ohio74 put teeth
in the federal exclusionary rule by making it applicable in state prosecutions.
Squabbling still occurred"5 and it was not until Malloy v. Hogan"6 that all
questions were put to rest. The court made clear its previous implications:
"[T]he guarantees of the First Amendment ... the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment . . .and the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment . . . axe all to be enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect these personal rights against federal encroachment." ' It then proceeded
to make applicable to the states the fifth amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. Upholding the right of a witness to refuse to answer questions
concerning the circumstances of arrest and conviction, the Court said: "Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion
prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.""8
Thus, the second contention of People v. Thayer fails in the face of the
Malloy holding. Not only does the "mere evidence" rule express a fundamental
freedom that no man may be convicted from his own mouth; it is further a
federal interpretation of the Bill of Rights now made binding on the states.
GerardK. Sandweg
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August, 1964, a fire was reported in a structure housing a printing plant and
an apartment. After the fire was extinguished, an investigation into its cause
and origin was commenced by the municipal fire chief and his associates pursuant
71 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
72 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
73 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
74 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
75 In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the Court affirmed a state finding
of probable cause to make an entry in a narcotics search, the Court spoke of "a mutual
obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches." Id. at 31 (echoing
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)). But, in the same decision, Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring, said: "Today this distinction in constitutional principles is abandoned. Henceforth
state searches and seizures are to be judged by the same constitutional standards as apply
in the federal system." Id. at 45. A few months later, in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85
(1963), a state was not allowed to apply its harmless error rule to justify the inclusion of
evidence. The dissent argued the Court was actually applying federal standards to the states,
protesting: "Evidentiary questions of this sort are not a proper part of this Court's business,
particularly in cases coming here from state courts over which this Court posesses no supervisory power." Id. at 92.
76 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
77 Id. at 10.
78 Id. at 8.
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to statutory authorization.- Investigation was prolonged for a period of weeks
during which the premises were re-entered several times. While no-search warrant was requested or secured, there was nothing in the record to indicate that
the defendant who owned an interest in the printing plant and lived in the
apartment consented to the inspections. Based in part on evidence obtained
through this investigation, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury for
arson. Prior to trial, the accused moved to suppress the testimony of the fire
chief and his associates relating to their investigation of his premises, alleging
that the search was unconstitutional.2 The trial court sustained the motion to
suppress this evidence. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Iowa held: a civil,
post-fire inspection without a warrant pursuant to statutory authorization is not
an unreasonable search as prohibited by the United States or Iowa Constitutions.
State v. Rees, 139 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1966).
In Rees, the court concluded that the search in question fulfilled the essential requirement of the fourth amendment- reasonableness.' The inspectors
gained entrance to the premises by virtue of a statute authorizing such an investigation. This statutory authority stamped their search as reasonable. Once there,
any evidence discovered became the fruit of legally authorized search.' While
conceding that civil inspections pursuant to statutory authorization may be
undertaken without a search warrant, the dissent argued that the fire chief's
inspection was unreasonable because at some point it became a search for incriminating evidence to be used in a criminal proceeding. Thus, it fell within
the fourth amendment's prohibition of such searches without a warrant.'
The Rees court was faced with the necessity of balancing the individual's
right to be secure from unbridled governmental invasion into his privacy with
the state's interest in preserving the public welfare in a highly complex, urbanized society. Both the majority and dissent agreed that a warrant is unnecessary
to conduct a civil search based on the police powers of the state, but that a
warrant is required where the search could be characterized as criminal in
nature. This distinction between criminal and civil searches relied upon so
heavily by the Iowa court was thought to be in keeping with the traditional
historical interpretation of the limits of fourth amendment coverage.
1 IowA CODE ANN., tit. 5, ch. 100, § 100.2 (Supp. 1965): "The chief of the fire
department . . . shall investigate into the cause, origin and circumstances of every fire . . .
and determine whether such fire was the result of natural causes, negligence or design."
IOWA CODE ANN., tit. 5, ch. 100, § 100.10' (1949): "The state fire marshal, and his designated subordinates, in the performance of their duties, shall have authority to enter any
building or premises and to examine the same and the contents thereof."
§ 100.12 provides: "Mhe chief of the fire department aforesaid shall have authority to enter
any building or premises and to examine the same and contents thereof . . ." and to order
correction of any unsafe condition.
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV, provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Since the Iowa Const., art. I, § 8 (1857) is almost identical, reference will only be made
to the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
3 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4 "Under the Fourth Amendment if the search is reasonable and lawful the fact that
it becomes accusatory by the finding of incriminating evidence does not make it invalid."
139 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Iowa 1966). Cf. State v. Hagen, 137 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1965).
5 Id. at 419.
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The genesis of the fourth amendment was a general reaction in England
and colonial America to the abuse of executive power made possible through
widespread use of search warrants. "The Crown saw in these new devices a
most effective means of ferreting out seditious matter and of bringing the offenders to justice."' These general warrants were obtained without the necessity of
showing probable cause that a crime was suspected and were usually issued
without naming a specific suspect or place to be searched.' Popular distaste
in England toward these practices culminated in Entick v. Carrington This
was a trespass action against the King's messengers who, armed with a general
warrant, searched a private dwelling for unspecified, seditious books and papers.
In finding them guilty of trespass, Lord Camden dealt a lethal blow to the power
of general warrants.9 Colonial governments engaged in an equally odious practice. Writs of Assistance were issued to revenue officers allowing them to search
anywhere for smuggled goods. James Otis referred to these warrants as the
"worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty
and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English lawbook."'o
Out of these sad experiences grew the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and judicial insistence on a limited,
specific warrant." The abuses which gave rise to the fourth amendment have
been eliminated, but its raison d'etre has not disappeared.' Historically, courts
have dealt with the fourth amendment almost exclusively in the context of
criminal proceedings, but its inherent logic does not demand such a restricted
application.' Insistence on protecting the individual from unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be maintained in a vacuum, separated from the exigencies
of urban living. Our forefathers may have lived where congestion, noise, health
and safety hazards were at a minimum, but the rapid process of urbanization
has thrown large populations together, generating health and safety problems
of a complexity never faced in the past. To insure adequate protection against
6 Wood, The Scope Of The Constitutional Immunity Against Searches And Seizures,
34 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1927).
7 "Armed with their roving commission, they [King's ministers] set forth in quest of
unknown offenders; and, unable to take evidence, listened to rumors, idle tales, and curious

guesses. They held in their hands the liberty of every man whom they were pleased to suspect."
1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 612 n.1 (8th ed. 1927). See Fraenkel, Concerning
Search And Seizure, 34 HARV. L. Rav. 361 (1921).
8 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). Accord, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9 "The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property.
That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been
taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole. . . By the laws
of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.

No man

can set his foot upon my ground without my license.. ." 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
This was followed by a House of 'Commons resolution prohibiting the issuance of general
warrants in all but specifically provided for circumstances. Id. at 1074-75.
10

2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 523-24 (1850).

11 2 STOREY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1902,
at 648 (1891). See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.05 (1958); MORELAND,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 101-02 (1959). A good treatment of the history of Writs
of Assistance may be found in Quincy's Mass. Rep., 469-82 (1761-1772).
12 "[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Cf. Nueslein v.
District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 692 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
13 See WooD, supra note 6, at 12.
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the menace of fire and disease, inspections of private premises are required. The
Rees court accepted the fact that governmental police power has long authorized
warrantless searches to promote health, safety, and welfare. 1 However, most
of these early decisions involved public or quasi-public institutions rather than
inspection of private dwellings. 5
One of the first attacks on administrative searches into private premises
was initiated in District of Columbia v. Little.'6 Little refused to admit a health
inspector acting under statutory authority, thus subjecting himself to prosecution
for interfering with an inspector in the exercise of his official duties. Judge
Prettyman rejected the contention that civil inspections, unlike a search for
evidence to be used in a criminal proceeding, may be effected without a warrant.' He saw the interest of the individual requiring protection in both civil
and criminal searches as identical, and that it would be a "fantastic absurdity"
to deny the right of privacy to a man not suspected of a crime and guarantee
it to a man who is.'
The controversy was by no means resolved by Judge Prettyman in the
Little decision. Givener v. Maryland 9 upheld the statutory authority of a fire
inspector and health commissioner to enter private premises for an inspection.
The Givener court, like the Rees court, reasoned that the abuses behind the
fourth amendment were of criminal searches. Thus, where inspection is made
to protect the general welfare, no warrant is required. 0 The criminal-civil
dichotomy was again resorted to in State v. Buxton,2 a case almost factually
identical to Rees. After a fire had occurred in a restaurant, a deputy fire marshal and his associates entered the premises pursuant to statutory authorization.
As the investigation progressed, evidence of arson became increasingly apparent.
In an opinion similar to the Rees dissent, the court held that a search warrant
was required. Though the search may have been civil when commenced, it took
14 In City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960), officials entered and
inspected a boardinghouse for zoning and building code violations. The court held that fourth
amendment does not prohibit inspections made pursuant to an exercise of police power.
Keiper v. City of Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913), upheld ordinances authorizing health inspector to enter any building where food products were stored or kept for
sale. Also held valid was a statute empowering building inspector to enter a hotel without
warrant to determine if it was of fireproof construction. Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36,
126 N.W. 914 (1910). See Sister Felicitas v. Hartridge, 148 Ga. 832, 98 S.E. 538 (1919);
State v. Normand, 76 N.H. 541, 85 AtI. 899 (1913); CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH
Freund maintains,
AND SEIZURE § 35 (2d ed. 1930); Note, 72 HARV. L. R.EV. 504 (1959).

however, that administrative inspections do require issuance of a search warrant. FREUND,
THE POLICE PoWER § 47 (1904).
15 The court relied heavily on Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 Atl. 595 (1936).
There, a state veterinarian entered a private barn to inspect animals for contagious diseases.
A statute authorized such inspection as incident to state police power. Factually, a quasipublic institution was not involved here, but the decision hung on the necessity of property
rights yielding to police power. The Dederick court never discussed the fourth amendment
or right to privacy. Rees also involved a search of private premises. The record gave no
indication that the investigations were restricted solely to the printing plant.
16 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
17 "The argument is wholly without merit, preposterous in fact." Id. at 16.
18 Id. at 17.
19 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
20 The court stated, "Few rights are absolute. . . . Here the problem is one of personal
privacy as against the protection of the public health and safety." Id. at 774.
21 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d 547 (1958).
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on a criminal character when it became obvious to the inspectors that incriminating evidence might be discovered. 2
In 1959, the Supreme Court fanned the controversy over administrative
searches. Mr. Justice Frankfurter adopted the criminal-civil test in affirming
the conviction of a person who refused entrance to a health inspector in Frank
v. Maryland." The fourth amendment was viewed as granting a twofold protection- the right to privacy and the right to be free from governmental invasions aimed at securing incriminating matter.24 It was accepted that the purpose of the inspection was not to further a criminal prosecution, but merely to
detect unsafe conditions which could thus be remedied. The dissenters in Frank
did not emphasize the purpose of the search, but rather the unrestricted invasion
of privacy which the search occasioned.2" They concluded that the majority
decision "greatly dilutes the right of privacy which every homeowner had the
right to believe was part of our American heritage.""0
The ink had hardly dried on the Frank opinion when, four weeks later,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear Eaton v. Price." There, the conviction of a
person refusing to grant entrance to health inspectors was affirmed by an equally
divided court." The four Frank dissenters adhered to their earlier position,
remarking that the majority decision was "the dubious pronouncement of a
gravely divided Court."29
In People v. Laverne,"0 the New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for violation of a municipal zoning ordinance when evidence of such
violation was obtained through a warrantless inspection. Distinguishing Frank,
the court refused to label this investigation into zoning violations a civil search
because its results were to be directly used in a criminal prosecution. The
Laverne approach is only a stopgap solution to the problem of administrative
searches.2" The distinction between criminal and civil searches is an inadequate

22 Id. at 97, 148 N.E.2d at 551.
23 359 U.S. 360, rehearing denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959).
24 Stressing the relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments, Justice Frankfurter narrowed application of the fourth to searches for incriminating evidence. Id. at
364-66. See 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1959). Contra, Note, 44 ILL. L. Rav. 845 (1950).
25 "It was not the search that was vicious. It was the absence of a warrant issued on a
showing of probable cause...
" Id. at 379. The dissenters included Justices Douglas, Warren, Black, and Brennan.
26 Id. at 374. "mhe protection of the Fourth Amendment has heretofore been thought
to protect privacy when civil litigation, as well as criminal prosecutions, was in the offing."
Id. at 375.
27 360 U.S. 246 (1959). Unlike Frank, the inspectors in Eaton were empowered to enter
premises even where they had no reason to suspect a nuisance existed. 364 U.S. 263, 265
(1960).
28 Justice Stewart did not sit.
29 364 U.S. 263, 269 (1960), citing concurring opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
24 (1958). It is noteworthy that today the Frank dissenters still sit on the Court, whereas
Justices White and Fortas have replaced Frankfurter and Whittaker. It is not altogether
certain that, given a Frank-type case, the Court would adhere to its position in Frank.
30 People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
31 This application of the fourth amendment is like closing the barn door after the
horse has been stolen. If the right of privacy is an essential guarantee, refusing to convict
a person on the basis of evidence obtained during a criminal search without a warrant still
does not get to the heart of that guarantee. Validity of the search is predicated on its results.
At that point privacy has already been invaded. See Note, 1965 DuxE L.J. 158.
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basis on which to determine coverage of the fourth amendment. 2 Often the
line separating criminal and civil proceedings is hazy.33 Furthermore, such a
categorization may make protection of privacy contingent on the inspectors'
intent in making the search. This invites a "trial of the officers' purposes.""
Under the criminal-civil test, if the search can be labeled civil, even though
investigation fortuitously turns up evidence of criminal activity as in Rees, a
warrant is not required. Does it matter to the individual whether a warrantless
search of his premises is conducted pursuant to an administrative regulation or
a criminal investigation? Professor Barrett asserts, "In each case his privacy
has been invaded by an official authority which he is powerless to resist."3
If the criminal-civil distinction is abandoned, a search warrant would be
required to conduct a civil search. Thus, it would be necessary for inspectors
to show probable cause that a safety or health violation exists before they can
obtain a warrant. This would not unduly hamper enforcement of statutes similar
to the one found in Rees because the mere occurrence of a fire would itself be
sufficient reason to grant a warrant. Unfortunately, though, many hazards are
not evident until inspection is actually performed. In such situations, some
contend that enforcement of safety regulations would be hampered if warrants
were required before investigations were made." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
maintained that the power to inspect "would be greatly hobbled by the blanket
requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal
acts."
On the other hand, if courts tried to preserve the effectiveness of
inspections by issuing warrants according to a relaxed standard of probable
cause, the concept would be hopelessly diluted.' The Frank and Eaton dissenters did not view this as an insoluble problem: "The test of 'probable cause'
required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the
search that is being sought"; probable cause in civil searches "may have quite
different requirements. . .. ,"" "To be sure, the showing that will justify a
housing inspection to check compliance with health and safety regulations is
different from that which would justify a search for narcotics. . . . To each
specific warrant, an appropriate specific showing is necessary.""
32 For example, criminal sanctions may be imposed for failure to abate a code violation,
or refusal to allow entrance to an inspector. Is the inspection civil or criminal? See 63
HARV. L. Rav. 349 (1949); Comment, 44 MiNN. L. Rv. 513 (1960).
33 In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
34 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 254 (1960) (dissenting opinion). The majority
opinion conceded if the purpose of the administrative inspection was to find criminal evidence, it would not be valid without a warrant. Id. at 230.
35 Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUPREME
COURT REV. 46, 73. See 28 TEXAs B.J. 93 (1965).
36 Stahl & Kuhn, Inspections And The Fourth Amendment, 11 U. PITT. L. Rnv. 256,
273-75 (1950); 49 MiNN. L. REv. 319, 323 (1964). See Note, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
421 (1960). The argument is made that health and safety programs would be rendered
impotent if reliance were placed primarily on the receipt of complaints before investigations
were commenced. Administrative officials must be given power to initiate investigations.
Id. at 430-31. See also Wolf & Lustig, Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence In State and
Federal Courts, 43 MiNN. L. REv. 1083 (1959). Contra, Comment, 44 MINN. L. REv. 513,
528-30 (1960).
37 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959), denied.
38 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 277 (1959).
39 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959).
40 Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 273 (1960). Contrapoised to this view is the objection
that the kind of protection afforded by a warrant issued under these circumstances is not
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Some suggest that the individual's right of privacy could even be protected
without the formal necessity of showing probable cause to obtain a search
warrant if certain safeguards were built into the statutes and ordinances authorizing inspections. They could provide that an inspection effectuating the police
power could be conducted without a warrant only if reasonable notice was sent
to the occupant, inspection was made at a convenient time, and harassment
was avoided. 4 Of course, the question again arises as to whether this approach
to administrative searches provides the requisite protection demanded by the
fourth amendment.
If the right of privacy lies at the heart of the fourth amendment, no safeguards short of a validly issued warrant will fulfill its constitutional mandate.
"[W]here one comes out on a case depends on where one goes in." 2 The
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not aimed
merely at the abuses of general warrants or of criminal searches, rather its protection pervades the entire area of governmental invasion into a citizen's
privacy.4" Unquestionably, this right has most frequently been enunciated and
defended by courts in the context of a criminal proceeding.44 However, the
principle is broader"5 - the basis of the fourth amendment is the right to
46
privacy

as stringent as that envisaged by the Constitution. A flexible concept of probable cause
would make it difficult to distinguish a capricious inspection resulting through blanket issuance of warrants from legitimate searches. Comment, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 291 (1965).
One author nonetheless insists:
While the search warrant was not designed to deal with this type of entry by
administrative officials, it is becoming increasingly evident that the right of privacy,
which inter alia the warrant has always protected, should not go by default for
want of legal machinery fashioned to accommodate the new situation. And, in
lieu of such machinery, the availability of the warrant has seemed on some statutory
occasions to be a small price to pay.
Waters, Rights Of Enry In Administrative Officers, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 79, 93 (1959).
41 See Note, 28 G-o. WAsH. L. Ray. 421, 450-52 (1960). Cf. 49 MINN. L. REv. 319,
324 (1964).
42 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
43 The Constitutional authors
"recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the most valued
by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustified intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
Accord, Beaney, The Constitutional Right To Privacy In The Supreme Court, 1962 SUPREME
COURT RIv. 212, 214.
44 "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police- which is
at the core of the Fourth Amendment- is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Cf. Abel v. United States, 262 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (dissenting
opinion); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585, 598 (1904); State v. Shephard, 255 Iowa 1218, 1226, 124 N.W.2d 712, 717
(1963).
45 "[T]hese Amendments [fourth and fifth] should receive a liberal construction, so as
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual deprecation' of the rights secured by them,
by imperceptible practice of courts or well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive
officers." Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921). Accord, Go-Bart Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
46 50 CORNELL L.Q. 282, 288 (1965). The Frank dissenters asserted, "It was designed
to protect the citizen against uncontrolled invasion of his privacy." 359 U.S. 360, 381 (1959),
rehearing denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959).
"It is not the breaking of his doors, and rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes
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"In view of the readiness of zealots to ride roughshod over claims of privacy
for any ends that impress them as socially desirable, we should not make inroads
on the rights protected by this Amendment.""7 In allowing the state to demand
entrance into a private citizen's premises, we are giving the state a great deal
of power which can be indiscreetly handled and abused. "History shows that
all officers tend to be officious.... ."" Unlike other exercises of state power, there
exists little effective remedy against an unwarranted intrusion once the intrusion

has occurred. Once privacy has been violated, even the exclusion of evidence
thereby obtained does not fully satisfy the injury done to the citizen. Whether
the individual's privacy must yield to the coercive power of the state to search

should be a matter for determination by a disintersted magistrate. The fourth
amendment's intent is to interpose a neutral party, the magistrate, between the
citizen and the state. 9
It is submitted that since privacy is the essential interest sought to be

secured by the fourth amendment and that a disinterested judicial officer is in
the best position to determine when individual privacy may be invaded by the
state, the Rees holding falls short of constitutional requirements for an administrative search. The fact that a search is classified as civil does not stamp an
imprimatur on everything the inspector may decide to undertake. In many
cases, the distinction between civil and criminal investigations will be blurred.
Furthermore, the fourth amendment does not respect such a distinction. The
crux of the question is protection of privacy, not the purpose of the search."0
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property. . . ." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886). See Also, Joe V. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550-52 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
47 Justice Jackson dissenting in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947).
The possibility for abuse of administrative searches is great.
"Harassment of unpopular minorities, political dissenters, and party opponents
can occur with few, if any, means of protecting the individual. Many police departments will find it useful to set up close working relations with health inspectors,
to be utilized where there is insufficient evidence to justify arrest or search and
seizure.

"

Beaney, supra note 43, at 245. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 242 (1959) (dissenting opinion); 17 U. Cim. L. Rtv. 733, 739-40 (1950). See also 10 HASTiNGS LJ. 430,
435 (1959).
48 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 382 (1959) (dissenting opinion), rehearing denied
360 U.S. 914 (1959). But see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947): "But we
should not permit our knowledge that abuses sometimes occur to give sinister coloration to
procedures which are basically reasonable"; In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 336 (1957).
49
"[Ijnformed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue
warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution
are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen
to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained
by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty
officers ...

"

United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). While this case involved a search
for criminal evidence, the principle enunciated is of universal applicability. See Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (dissenting opinion); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947); District of Columbia v. Little, f78 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir.
1949); State v. Hagen, 137 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1965). It should also be noted that
a likely effect of a judicial demand for probable cause for administrative searches would
be in the adoption of stricter standards by administrative officials themselves in their "daily
practice." Comment, 44 MINN. L. Rav. 513, 532 n.70 (1960).
50 It is quite probable, moreover, that even under the Frank holding the search in Rees
was unconstitutional. The Iowa statute authorizes a search to determine if the fire was the
"result of natural causes, negligence or design." IowA CODE ANN., tit. 5, ch. 100, § 100.2
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As far as the individual's interest is concerned, the object of the search is irrelevant. A due concern for civil liberties would not impose an undue burden in
the Rees situation; demonstration of probable cause to search premises which
fire has damaged or destroyed would not be an overly onerous burden for inspectors to bear.
The solution offered by the dissent in Rees is no more adequate than the
majority's. It also accepts the validity of the criminal-civil search distinction,
thus overlooking the pervasive character of the fourth amendment. Once
privacy is invaded, it is of little consolation to the citizen that inspectors must
obtain a warrant if they begin to seek criminal evidence.
Only caution in restricting application of the fourth amendment will prevent a gradual erosion of the civil liberties it protects. The needs of a complex
society are many and new methods of fulfilling these needs should not be summarily rejected by the courts. The fourth amendment does not prohibit the
type of inspections found in Rees. It only requires that a validly issued search
warrant be obtained when the state desires to enter the premises of a nonconsenting individual. Privacy and efficient exercise of governmental police
power can co-exist. However, we must recognize that today's greater need for
preventive and investigatory inspections also presents a greater opportunity for
creation of institutionalized procedures which sacrifice the sacred inviolability
of the human person to the needs of an efficient administrative machine.
John Thomas Harty

COMPENSATION REDEMPTIONS MIoHiGAN
REDEMPTION OF LIABILrTY FOR MEDIcAL BENEFITS.-

WORKMEN'S

LuMp Sum

ALLOWS

On May

1, 1956, Robert Lee Young, while at work for his employer, suffered injuries
from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. He began
receiving workmen's compensation benefits at a rate later corrected to $34.00
per week. On August 1, 1956, Mr. Young was adjudged mentally incompetent
by the Wayne County Probate Court, which appointed Betty H. Crooks as his
guardian. The guardian, having obtained the authorization of the Probate
Court, signed an agreement, dated August 8, 1957, to redeem the employer's
liability for weekly compensation payments under § 22, Part II of the Michigan

Workmen's Compensation Act.' The agreement was filed with the Workmen's
Compensation Department for approval, and a redemption hearing was held on
August 12, 1957 before referee James Broderick. On September 6, 1957, referee
Broderick entered an order "that said agreement to redeem the employer's
entire liability for weekly payments herein by the payment of $15,000 be
approved." 2
(Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.) A literal reading of the statute indicates that one of the
purposes for which fire inspection is conducted is to gather possible criminal evidence.

Both

the majority and dissent ignored this point, but under Frank the search could validly be
labeled as criminal. Thus a warrant would be required.
1 MIcH. C mp. LAws § 412.22 (1948).
2 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Mich. 1966).
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On April 14, 1960, plaintiff as successor guardian, filed an application for
a hearing and adjustment of claim for additional weekly payments and medical
benefits. Defendants moved to dismiss the application on the grounds that the
entire matter had been resolved by the approved redemption agreement. In a
reply to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff withdrew his claim for weekly payments
and opposed the motion on the sole basis that rights to medical benefits were
not settled by the approved redemption agreement. Referee Broderick held
"that the redemption ordered [sic] entered herein on September 6, 1957 had
no affect [sic] on defendants' liability to provide medical care under section 4
of part 2 of the workmen's compensation act." The defendant appealed to the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board which held that rights to medical
benefits were settled by the approved redemption agreement, and entered an
order granting defendant's motion to dismiss.' On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Michigan, the main question entertained by the court was: "did the commission board lack jurisdiction to make a lump sum settlement of medical benefits?" 5 The Supreme Court of Michigan, affirming the Appeal Board, held:
the redemption provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act gives the Commission Board jurisdiction to make a lump-sum settlement of medical benefits.
Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 1966).
Today every state has a workmen's compensation statute.6 The theory of
workmen's compensation was expressed in the slogan attributed to David Lloyd
George: "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman. ' The
workmen's compensation movement
was a revolt from the old common law and the creation of a complete
substitute therefor, and not a mere improvement therein. It meant to
make liability dependent on a relationship to the job, in a liberal, humane
fashion, with litigation reduced to a minimum. It meant to cut out narrow
common-law methods of denying awards."
The workmen's compensation law in Michigan was
adopted to give employers protection against common-law actions and to
place upon industry, where it properly belongs, not only the expense of the
hospital and medical bills of the injured employee, but place upon it the
burden of making a reasonable contribution to the sustenance of that
employee and his dependents during the period of time he is incapacitated
from work. This was the express intent of the legislature in adopting this
law. 9
To further this intent, the Michigan compensation act virtually did away with
3 Ibid.

4 Brief for Appellee, p. 3.
5 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Mich. 1966).
6 PROSSER, TORTS 554 (3d ed. 1964).
7 Ibid.
8 HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON 8 (1944). See generally Sheppard v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957); Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's
Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L.

Rnv. 57.

9 Lahti v. Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 585, 99 N.W.2d 490, 493 (1959). See also Harper
v. Lowe, 272 Mich. 331, 262 N.W. 260 (1935).
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common law theories of negligence, contributory negligence, negligence of a
fellow employee; and assumption of risk in return for a program of speedy
compensation to the injured employee and practically exclusive liability for the
employer.'
A specific section of the Michigan act designed to speed compensation to
an injured employee is the first provision of part 2, § 22 which is popularly
known as the redemptions provision. It provides:
Whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less than 6
months, the liability therefor may be redeemed by the payment of a lump
sum by agreement of the parties, subject to the approval of the compensation commission ....
Under this section, instead of receiving weekly payments over an extended period
of time, an employee can settle his claim for compensation against the employer
by executing a redemption agreement calling for one lump sum payment. The
agreement is subject to approval by the compensation commission to protect
employees from making prejudicial settlements. 2
Once a settlement has been entered into under the redemptions provision,
it is considered a final redemption of the employer's further liability for weekly
payments. This has been the Michigan court's view from the section's first
interpretation"3 up to its most recent construction in Wehmeier. An illustrative
10 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F.Supp. 547, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1965). See
also Pettaway v. McConaghy, 367 Mich. 651, 116 N.W.2d 789 (1962); Smith v. Pontiac
Motor Car Co., 277 Mich. 652, 270 N.W. 172 (1936).
11 MicH. Comp. LAws § 412.22 (1948). The second provision of this statute, not at
issue in this case, is popularly known as lump sum advances. It provides:
[Slaid compensation commission may at any time direct in any case, if special circumstances be found which in its judgment require the same, that the deferred
payments due under this act be commuted on the present worth thereof at 5%
per annum to 1 or more lump sum payments, and that such payments shall be made
by the employer or the insurance company carrying such risk, or commissioner of
insurance.
The test to see if a settlement falls within the first or second provision of the statute is given
by Anderson v. Clark Equip. Co., 278 Mich. 492, 270 N.W. 761 (1936): "We have heretofore held that the line of demarcation between the two procedures is whether the settlement is made by approved agreement or by award on petition." 1d. at 497, 270 N.W. at
763.
12 It has been uniformly held in Michigan that an unapproved settlement receipt is
without force to stop compensation. E.g., Sackolitz v. Mid-West Abrasive Co., 322 Mich.
666, 34 N.W.2d 468 (1948); Hurst v. Ford Motor Co., 276 Mich. 405, 267 N.W. 573,
(1936); Grant v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 264 Mich. 510, 250 N.W. 293 (1933). If a compensation agreement is not warranted by the statute, the Department of Labor and Industry
is without authority to approve it. Miller v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 279 Mich. 592, 277 N.W.

196 '(1937).
It is largely to the benefit of the workmen that the law demands specific compliance
with the terms of the act under the supervision of the Department of Labor and
Industry. Otherwise an unscrupulous employer could take advantage of the economic
pressure on a disabled workman who, because of his great need, might be unable
to withstand the temptation to accept an immediate offer of an inadequate amount,
or a doubtful promise, in lieu of the compensation to which he would be entitled
under the act.
McDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 268 Mich. 39, 45, 255 N.W. 378, 380 (1934). See also Dettloff
v. Hammond, Standish & Co., 195 Mich. 117, 161 N.W. 949 (1917). Weekly compensation
for injuries sustained is provided for by MicH. CoMp. LAws §§ 412.9, 412.10 (1948).
13
Doubtless under this provision when the parties make a valid agreement for a lump
sum payment in full for all compensation under the act, and such payment so agreed
upon has been authorized by the board and the payment made, the stage of weekly
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case showing the relation of the redemption provision to the lump sum advance
provision of the section is Catina v. Hudson Motor Car. Co. 4 It held:
[A] direction by the board that deferred payments be commuted to one or
more lump sum payments, under the second provision of... [§ 22] presents
no obstacle to a further review of weekly payments upon a showing of
change in condition. The order for the lump sum settlement in the instant
case was also made under this second provision. Had there been a contract for a lump sum settlement entered into by the parties and approved
by the board, in accordance with the first provision [redemptions] of this
section, and payment made accordingly, all payments would have been
redeemed and defendants discharged from further liability. 5
A second case, heavily relied upon by the court in Wehmeier, is Marks v. Otis
Elevator Co." In Marks, the court addressed itself specifically to the redemptions part of the statute in saying:
When a lump-sum settlement is made, in accordance with the first portion
of section 22 . . . the employee has the advantage of a large immediate
payment, and in this particular case, the furnishing of capital to conduct
a business; on the other hand, the employer or his insurer is taking a certain
risk. The employee may entirely recover from all disability, or he may
die, or he may earn a much larger sum than his average weekly wage at
the time of the injury, long before the lump sum would have been exhausted, had it been paid out in weekly payments. We do not find that
the payment of such lump sum in final settlement of all liability is against
public policy or the spirit of the act. The first portion of section 22 . . .
provides for such settlement. It is necessary that such settlement be
approved by the commission. As it was so approved in the instant
case, it
7
constituted a redemption from liability for all further payments.2
While there is no present doubt as to the finality of a settlement effected
under this statute, the scope of the statute was at issue in Wehmeier. The statute
itself, as well as the cases interpreting it, speaks in terns of settling only the
liability for weekly payments. Since this is the only section of the compensation
statute which provides for a lump sum settlement, it seems incongruous that the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board and the court in Wehmeier could
have held that the liability of the employer for medical benefits, due under a
separate section of the act," was also finally settled by the redemption agreepayments and review thereof has been passed. The liability has been redeemed.
The right to compensation has been terminated.
Norbut v. I. Stephenson Co., 217 Mich. 345, 347, 186 N.W. 716, 717 (1922). See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 308 Mich. 17, 13 N.W.2d 190 (1944);
Meyers v. Iron County, 297 Mich. 629, 298 N.W. 308 (1941); Marks v. Otis Elevator Co.,

276 Mich. 75, 267 N.W. 790 (1936); Catina v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 272 Mich. 377, 262
N.W. 266 '(1935).
14 272 Mich. 377, 262 N.W. 266 (1935).

15 Id. at 382, 262 N.W. at 268.
16

276 Mich. 75, 267 N.W. 790 (1936).

17 Id. at 78, 267 N.W. at 791.

18 MIcHr. CoMP. LAWS § 412.4 (1948). In regard'to medical expenses under the act
in general, see McDaniel v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannoi Foundry, 367 Mich. 356, 116 N.W.2d
835 (1962); Boyer v. Service Distribs., Inc., 366 Mich. 319, 115 N.W.2d 101 (1962); Tomes
v. General Motors Corp., 318 Mich. 168, 27 N.W.2d 520 (1947).
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ment.' What the court was called upon to do in Wehmeier was to construe § 22
to define "weekly payments" as used in the redemption statute, or more specifically, to decide what can be settled under the statute, the term "weekly payments" notwithstanding.
The problem of statutory construction facing the court in Wehmeier will
be better explained by reviewing the legislative history of the redemptions and
medical benefits sections of the act. In 1912, the date of the compensation act's
enactment, medical and hospital care benefits were limited to the first three
weeks following the date of the injury." Subsequently in 1919, they were extended to 90 days, 2 and remained unamended until 1943. Thus before 1943,
when they were extended to a duration of one year,2 2 a final settlement under
§ 22 was literally a final settlement of all liability, since medical benefits expired
after 90 days from the date of the injury and a settlement, by the terms of the
statute, could not be entered into until weekly payments had been continued
for six months. As a result, the only benefits remaining after six months, before
the 1943 amendment extended medical care to one year, were weekly payments.
It was the 1943 amendment that created the conflict between the two
statutes; the legislative and public policy in favor of a final settlement of liability
under the redemptions section conflicting with the legislative policy in favor of
providing extended medical and hospital care benefits to injured employees.
By the time the court was called upon to delineate between these two statutes
in Wehmeier, the medical section had been amended to provide for medical
benefits for as long as they were needed, 2 the amendment having been held
retroactive,24 while the redemptions section "remained substantially intact, without amendment, from the date of enactment down to the present date."2 5
In trying to reconcile the legislative intent behind these two sections, opposed in purpose and language, the court was faced with two alternatives. It
could construe the words, "weekly payment," in § 22 literally so that the liability
which can be redeemed would not include medical benefits. Or, it could construe the words according to what they meant prior to 1943, as being inclusive
of the employer's total liability. 6 To aid this task, the legislative policy in favor
of settlements was examined: "In 1912 when . .. [the] legislature determined
it would provide for regular weekly payments to the injured employee, it also
recognized the fact that in certain cases a lump sum settlement would be more
helpful to the injured employee." 2r But at the same time, compensation was
19 Of the three types of benefits available under the act, viz.: medical and other care services, MICH. Comp. LAws § 412.4 (1948); death compensation, MICE. Comp. LAws § 412.8
(1948); and weekly compensation for the injury sustained, MICH. Comp. LAWS §§
412.9, 412.10 (1948) - § 22, under which the redemption was made, speaks only of weekly
payments and not "medical and other care services." Brief for Appellant, p. 6.
20 Mich. Pub. Acts 1912, No. 10.
21 Mich. Pub. Acts 1919, No. 64.
22 Mich. Pub. Acts 1943, No. 245.
23 Mich. Pub. Acts 1955, No. 250, as amended, MICH. Comp,. LAws § 412.4 (1948).
24 Lahti v. Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.2d 490 (1959).
25 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Mich. 1966).
26 Brief for the Auto Owners Ins. Co., Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., and Mich. Mut.
Liab. Co. as Amicus Curiae, p. 3, Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733 (Mich.
1966).
27 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Mich. 1966).
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viewed not as a private matter between employer and employee, but as one in
which the public was vitally interested. The compensation act's policy that the
burden of employee injuries be borne by industry was effectuated by a provision
for "frequent regular payments, weekly not monthly, or quarterly, or annually.
It opposes payments in gross or in lump sum, except in certain 'special circumstances.' "28
Of the three amicus curiae briefs filed in Wehmeier, two differed as to
whether public policy favored such settlement. The Michigan Chapter of the
American Trial Lawyers Association, while agreeing with Marks v. Otis Elevator " that the payment of a lump sum in final settlement of all liability is not

against public policy, pointed out that:
As is well recognized, redemptions serve their most important function in allowing compromises of borderline or difficult cases.... Compromise is the lubricant that permits people to overcome inter-human friction.... Almost all redemptions are compromises.... The compromise
that extricates the plaintiff from a dangerous gamble, from the highly
risky philosophy of "winner take all," is the redemption.... Public policy
should favor elimination of risk and gamble in litigation"'

The International Union, UAW, did not share this view:
The public policy is against lump sum payments and in favor of
payment over a period of time. This presents a compelling justification
for the legislative requirement that medical benefits be furnished when
they are needed and that they cannot be redeemed in one lump sum.31

The court, while accepting the proposition that public policy actively
encourages settlements, was influenced by the fact that if the rights to medical
benefits could not be redeemed under § 22, the redemptions clause would be
28 Harrington v. Department of Labor & Indus., 252 Mich. 87, 89, 233 N.W. 361, 362
(1930). As to the policy in favor of periodic payments as opposed to one lump sum payment, see generally Puchner v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 198 La. 921, 5 So. 2d 288
(1941); Ostegaard v. Adams-& Kelly Co., 133 Neb. 393, 203 N.W. 564 (1925); Hutchinson
v. Rufus Darrow's Son, Inc., 212 App.Div. 751, 209 N.Y.Supp. 527 (1925); Lauritzen v.
Terry & Tench Co., 193 App.Div. 809, 184 N.Y.Supp. 683 (1920). For the policy in favor
of medical benefits being paid over a period of time, see W. J. Newman Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
353 Ill. 190, 187 N.E. 137 (1933). Fehand v. City of St. Paul, 215 Minn. 94, 9 N.W.2d
349 (1943); Lawrence v. New York Butchers' Dressed Meat Co., 266 N.Y. 425, 195 N.E. 137

(1934);

HOROvITZ, WORCMEN'S COMPENSATION

292-97 (1944).

29 276 Mich. 75, 267 N.W. 790 (1936).
30 Brief for the Michigan Chapter of the American Trial Lawyers Assoc. as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 3-4, Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 1966).

31

Brief for the Int'l Union, UAW as Amicus Curiae, p. 7, Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood

Co., 139 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 1966). See cases cited note 28 supra. One observer has noted:
Although compensation law produces a tremendous number of contested and'litigated
cases, it should never be forgotten that they represent but a small fractionsomething like one-tenth to one-fifteenthof the claims that are disposed of
without contest. From the point of view of achievement of the everyday purposes
of the legislation, it has been rightly observed that "the successful administration
of a compensation law depends to a much greater extent upon the machinery
adopted for disposing of the undisputed claim than upon the methods of procedure
employed in the litigation of the contested case, important as the latter undoubtedly
"

is.
LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION chs. 36 & 37 (3d

2

338-39 (1961).
ed. 1951).

See generally 8

SCHNE DER,
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almost meaningless in effecting any type of liability settlement. As the chairman
of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board had pointed out:
To hold otherwise [to interpret the statute as not permitting redemption
of liabiliy for medical benefits] is to say that the legislature only intended
to permit a settlement of part of a compensation case while leaving the
question of medical care unresolved. Such a monstrous result would rob
the section of all meaning and usefulness. No one would ever think of
entering into an agreement to redeem a case in32 part and leave open the
possibility of future litigation over medical care.
The court agreed with this view. The action of the legislature in enlarging the
employee's rights to medical care in 1943 was not viewed as an expression of
legislative intent denying referees and the appeal board the right to approve
final settlements, including medical benefits. The court reasoned that if this
had been the legislative intent, it would have been clearly and definitely ex3
3

pressed.

Though the Michigan legislature failed to take action in the form of an
amendatory provision to § 22 that would have expressed their intent to exempt
medical benefits due under the act from § 22, their action in amending the
medical provision in 1955 to allow for indefinite care would imply such an
intention. Just as § 22 would be "robbed of all meaning" by saying medical
benefits aren't redeemable, so too the spirit behind the 1955 amendment would
be effectively nullified by saying they are subject to redemption. To allow employees the right to settle speculative amounts such as future medical benefits
by a lump sum redemption six months after the date of injury seems opposed
to the very idea of securing for injured employees the right to medical care
as the need may arise. The uncertainties prevalent in the amount of medical
care that may be needed are further shown by the fact that "sometimes operations become necessary months or years after the original injury." ' The fact
that an employee, while negotiating a redemption agreement as early as six
months after he is injured, is certainly in no position to estimate what future
medical care may be required for his injury again implies a legislative awareness that medical care should be provided over a period of time. This awareness was originally evidenced by the 1955 amendment to the medical benefits
provision of the act.
A literal reading of the redemptions statute reveals that the:
language of the statute is clear, and provides that with regard to any
"weekly payment," "liability therefor may be redeemed by the payment of
a lump sum". Thus, § 22 by express terms is authority only for redemption
of weekly compensation payments. Medical payments are not weekly payments
and, therefore, there is no statutory authority for their redemp35
tion.
32
33

Appendix of Brief for Appellant, p. 50a.
Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Mich. 1966).

34

HoRovrrz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 296 (1944).

35 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 742 (Mich. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
The redemption order entered by the hearing referee provided: "[I]t is ordered that said
agreement to redeem the employer's entire liability for weekly payments herein by the payment of $15,000.00 be: approved ....
" (Emphasis added.) Appendix of Brief for Appellant,
p. 16a.
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However, the court's decision not to give effect to the literal terms of the statute
by using the antithetical policies of allowing settlements and preserving the right
to continuing medical benefits as a basis for its decision was affected to a great
degree by the prior interpretations given § 22 by the various workmen's compensation agencies administering the act.3" The Workmen's Compensation
Department had consistently held since 1943 that a redemption operates to
terminate the employer's liability for medical benefits."r This settled construction
was further shown by the Department's action, pursuant to its statutory rulemaking powers,ss in promulgating a rule governing redemptions under § 22
which required that:
Any agreement to redeem the liability of the insurer or self-insured
employer must be submitted on form R.E.D. The agreement must be
accompanied by a report from a licensed physician approved by the employee
giving in detail the findings of a recent examination. 9
This rule, and prior rules of the same import, had been submitted to the legis-

lature,"' but no action had been taken regarding it. Since no legislative action
was taken, the defendant in Wehmeier argued that the legislature had, in effect,
"silently amended § 22 to permit redemption of liability for medical benefits
even while leaving unchanged the language which limits redemptions to weekly

benefits."'" Though the legislature might have inferred from the requirement
that there be a medical examination of the employee in a redemption proceeding
before the employer's liability for medical benefits would be terminated, it could
also have assumed that there were other valid reasons for such a requirement."
The court, over vigorous dissent,4" was strongly influenced by:
36 The court stated that "in several decisions we have considered the construction of an
act by those designated to enforce it as an important fact to be considered by us in our
determination of legislative intent and construction of the statute."
Webmeier v. W. E.
Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Mich. 1966). See, e.g., People v. Holbrook, 373 Mich. 94,
128 N.W.2d 484 "(1964); Lorraine Cab v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich 379, 98 N.W.2d 607
(1959); Wyandotte Savings Bank v. Eveland, 347 Mich. 33, 78 N.W.2d 612 (1956); Roosevelt Oil Co. v. Alger, 339 Mich. 679, 64 N.W.2d 582 (1954). But see In re Gay's Estate,
310 Mich. 226, 17 N.W.2d 163 (1945) where it was said: "Plain, unambiguous language in
a statute leaves no room for judicial construction and must be given effect according to the
plain meaning of the words." Id. at 230, 17 N.W.2d at 164.
37 Brief for the Auto Owners Ins. Co., Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., and Mich. Mut. Liab.
Co. as Amicus Curiae, p. 6, Webmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 1966).
38 MicH. ComP. LAws § 413.3 (1948).
39 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Mich. 1966).
40

MIcH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 24.78b, 24.78c (1948).

41 Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Mich. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
42 Other possible reasons could include:
[To determine precisely questions such as the nature of a specific loss, or whether
disability is partial, total, or total and permanent, all of which have a bearing on
the benefits to which an employee is entitled, and all of which would, therefore, be
of legitimate concern to the department in determining whether a redemption
agreement should be approved.
Id. at 745. It was also urged that the profession had always considered the redemptions
provision to allow parties to agree to settle all matters in a workmen's compensation case.
Brief for appellees, p. 10.
43
This is a case where an administrative agency has acted contrary to ambiguous
statutory language. It is our duty to uphold the law, and its continued violation
by an agency of the State does not seem to me to mandate our departure from this
course.
Wehmeier v. W. E. Wood Co., 139 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Mich. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
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The fact that repeatedly and consistently through the years, referees
and appeal boards have construed the provision now under consideration
in the same way as the present appeal board has so construed it in this

appeal.

....

44

This fact, "coupled with the additional fact that through these years the legislature has not objected to that construction, but, to the contrary, has given assent
by its silence"45 disposed the court to assent to the interpretation given § 22 by
the Appeal Board in Wehmeier.
It would have been in accord with the general policies of the Compensation

Act for the court to have read § 22 consistently with other sections of the act
by holding that medical benefits were not included under the redemption provision.46 However, legislative inactivity in failing to clarify the conflict between
the redemptions section and the medical benefits section made this task impossible
since the Workmen's Compensation Department's construction of the section
had consistently included medical benefits under the redemptions provision.
While a claim for medical benefits had been held to be a claim for compensation
and subject to the time requirements within which a claim for compensation
must be made,47 the Michigan court in Lahti v. Fosterling" observed "that such
benefits are a form of compensation for some purposes but not necessarily for
all."" This observation suggests that weekly payments and medical benefits are
not necessarily one and the same insofar as statutory construction is concerned.
If this were not true, there would have been no need for the court to transgress
the literal words of the redemption statute in Wehmeier.
The Compensation Department's long-standing view of § 22 as encompassing medical benefits was undoubtedly a vital factor considered by the court.
Perhaps the deleterious effects of narrowing the scope of § 22 after twenty-three
years of treating it as though medical benefits were redeemable far outweighed
the results of holding that medical benefits have been and will be redeemable
under § 22. But if the hesitancy at opening a Pandora's box, through a narrow
interpretation of § 22 was the main basis for following what had by now become
the accepted construction of § 22, the court could easily have avoided some of
the problems such a decision would present by enforcing its decision prospec50
tively.
While the effect of the court's holding in Wehmeier on future settlements
of claims to weekly payments and medical benefits is not clear at this time, the
44
45
46

Id. at 740.
Ibid.
The question presented relates to the proper interpretation of the clause of Act
No. 122, Pub. Acts 1941, above quoted. The basic rule governing the matter is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.. . . This requires that the clause
in question shall be read in connection with other pertinent provisions of the act
and that a meaning shall be given thereto consistent with the general purposes sought
to be accomplished.
Roberts Tobacco Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 322 Mich. 519, 530, 34 N.W.2d 54, 59 (1948).
See also Gardner-White Co. v. Dunckel, 296 Mich. 225, 295 N.W. 624 (1941); City of
Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N.W. 221 (1922).
47 Dornbos v. Bloch & Guggenheimer, Inc., 326 Mich. 626, 40 N.W.2d 749 (1950).
48 Lahti v. Fosterling, 357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.2d 490 (1959).
49 Id. at 584, 99 N.W.2d at 493.
50 See Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Wilson v.
Doehler-Jarvis Div. of Nat'1 Lead Co., 358 Mich. 510, 100 N.W.2d 226 (1960).
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logical result of this holding would seem to discourage settlements from the point
of view of an injured employee. Now that the Compensation Act in Michigan
provides for medical benefits to be paid by the employer to the injured employee
as the need may arise,"' no conceivable advantage in redeeming this claim exists.
While the liability for weekly payments is a fixed sum which lends itself to computation for purposes of one lump sum payment in lieu of regular payments,
the future liability for medical benefits is often impossible to estimate at any
given time for purposes of a lump sum settlement. Would it be possible for
an injured employee, under the authority of Wehmeier, to redeem only his weekly
payments, leaving the liability for medical benefits unsettled? Or, must a
redemption agreement, to be valid under the statute, include all his claims to
weekly as well as medical benefits? Clearly, Wehmeier will present many unforeseen difficulties in applying the redemptions provision.
Thus, while the decision in Wehmeier was designed to implement the public
policy in favor of a final settlement of liability for workmen's compensation
claims, it may have indirectly impeded this policy. It now remains for the
legislature of the State of Michigan, by an amendment to the redemptions provision clearly specifying its scope, to resolve the clash of values between the
legislative policies in favor of settlements and those in favor of extended medical
care so painfully demonstrated by the doubtful decision reached by the Michigan
court in Wehmeier.
Clifford A. Roe, Jr.

DAMAGES 'SUBSTANTIAL' PHYSICAL INJURY Is NOT REQuIRED To
AwARD DAMAGES FOR NERVOUS DISoaER IN AUTOMOBILE COLLISION CASE. The young female plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision which caused
over one thousand dollars damage to the vehicle in which she was a passenger
and permanently put the defendant's Post Office Department truck out of commission. She was later found to be suffering from a serious case of hypertension.
She went to a psychiatrist who diagnosed the case as psychiatric conversion.1
Plaintiff, in this action for damages, alleged that she had suffered severe nervous
and physical shock, lost time from her job, suffered periods of disability and was
unable to engage in her usual pursuits, duties and occupation. The trial court
found the collision resulted from the negligence of plaintiff's husband and a
government employee. However, the court made no findings on the amount of
damages plaintiff could recover because there was no substantial physical injury
which could be the basis of an award of damages for consequent nervous disorders. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held:
The district court erred in concluding that the law in the jurisdiction required
"substantial" physical injury before an award for nervous disorder was possible.

51 Mxcir. ComP. LAws § 412.4 (1948).
1 The principal psychiatric witness testified that: "[W]hen we talk about a conversion
reaction, we mean there is some emotional problem which causes anxiety in a person; that
anxiety is then precipitated or converts into some kind of a physical symptom." Brief for
Appellee, p. 6, Parrish v. United States, 357 F. 2d 828 (D.C.Oir. 1966).
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Case remanded for a determination of whether appellant's psychiatric disorders
were a proximate result of the physical injuries she sustained. Parrish v. United
States, 357 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
This case presents an excellent example of the present state of confusion
in the law dealing with mental disorders as they are related to tort actions. Some
states allow recovery for mental distress or disorder in certain specific circumstances and deny it in others. The first situation arises where there is a negligently
produced physical injury and accompanying mental pain and suffering. As it
is common knowledge that nearly all physical injuries are accompanied by such
suffering, it is not surprising that the majority of courts allow recovery in this
situation.' An example of where common knowledge would assume that there
would be accompanying mental pain and suffering following a physical injury
is illustrated by disfigurement cases. Generally, mental pain in contemplation
of permanent disfigurement is considered an element of damage,' though there
are cases to the contrary.4 Mental pain and suffering proximately resulting from
a wrong which in itself constitutes a cause of action is a proper element of
compensatory damages.5 Upon proper allegations and medical proof as to causation, it is generally held that recovery will be allowed for emotional disturbances
precipitated by physical injuries.' Damages for mental suffering are recoverable
in tort actions for trespass, nuisance and breach of warranty accompanied by
physical injuries.' Where allowed, such recovery is an element of actual or
compensatory damages.' The difficulty of measuring damages for loss of enjoyment of life in terms of money does not constitute a bar to recovery of such
damages.9 The fact that the victim is a child likewise should not be a bar to
recovery for mental suffering.' This, then, represents the general rule, although
many jurisdictions have their own peculiar qualifications.
2 E.g., Hamilan Corp. v. O'Neill, 273 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (worry over drinking
beverage containing glass particles); Nomey v. Great American Ind. Co., 121 So.2d 763
(La. App. 1960) (worry over unborn child); Caspermeyer v. Florsheim Shoe Store Co., 313
S.W.2d 198 (Mo. App. 1958).
3 E.g., Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920); Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co.,
289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961); Steele v. Brown, 43 Ill. App. 2d 293, 193 N.E.2d 352 (1963).
4 E.g., Lake St. El. R. Co. v. Gromley, 108 Ill. App. 59 (1903); Spencer v. Webster, 305
Ky. 10, 202 S.W.2d 752 (1947); Halladay v. Ingram, 78 R.I. 464, 82 A.2d 875 (1951).
5 E.g., Chavez v. United States, 192 F.Supp. 263 (Mont. 1961); Beaty v. jBuckeye
Fabric Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38
Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Ackerman v. Thompson, 356 M. 558, 202 S.W.2d 795
(1947).
6 E.g., Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955); Thacker
v. Ward, 263 N.C. 594, 140 S.E.2d 23 (1965); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112
S.E.2d 48 (1960) (damages denied because there were no actual physical injuries).
7 E.g., Hamilan Corp. v. O'Neill, 273 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Mack v. Hugh W.
Comstock Associates, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964); Gay v. A. & P. Food Stores, 39 Misc.2d
360, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (breach of implied warranty) ; Sawyer v. Dougherty,
286 App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1955) (trespass to person).
8 E.g., Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F.Supp. 127 (N.D. Ia. 1953); Fontenot v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955); Poledna v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 360
Mich. 129, 103 N.W.2d 789 (1960) (object of damages for injury to feelings is to make
injured party whole rather than to punish the wrongdoer).
9 E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952)
(administrative difficulties do not justify denial of relief for serious invasion of mental and
emotional tranquility); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright, 246 Ky. 208, 54 S.W.2d 666
(1932); McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964).
10 E.g., Williams v. Jones, 26 Ga.App. 558, 106 S.E. 616 (1921); Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Williams, 144 Miss. 804, 110 So. 510 (1926); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sauter, 46 Tex.
Civ. App. 309, 103 S.W. 201 (1907).
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One such qualification, utilized by the lower court- in Parrish,is that the
precipitating physical injury be of a substantial nature. The lower court based
its opinion, in part, on Perry v. Capital Traction Co.,"i one of its own prior
opinions. There, the plaintiffs, as the result of an automobile collision, suffered
from crying spells, headaches, stammering, sleeplessness, and inability to work
up to their normal capacity. Since the nervous shock was not directly attributable
to the physical injuries sustained, the court denied relief for mental pain and
suffering caused by nervous shock or fright not traceable to the physical injuries.
In explaining its action, the court stated that the justification for such nile was:
[M]ere fright is easily simulated and difficult to disprove, and that impairment of the nervous system is of such an intangible character that there is
no practical standard by which the extent of the impairment may be
determined. Where there has been a substantial physical injury, medical
testimony and common knowledge may furnish a guide for measuring the
pain and suffering incidental to the injury; but when, as here, there has
been no substantial physical injury, a jury ought not to be permitted to
indulge in conjecture
and speculation as to the effects of alleged nervous
12
shock or fright.

A similar qualification restricting recovery is the so-called "impact" rule.
In the past many courts have felt that there was more certainty that a, claim for
mental anguish was legitimate if there had been some type of external impact
with the claimant.' 3 However, adherents to this rule have steadily declined in
number due to its illogical infirmities. 4 This is demonstrated by the fact that
many courts pay lip service to the rule but hold it satisfied by slight and trivial
contacts which play no part in causing substantial harm. For example, such
"impact" has been found in a slight blow,' the inhalation of smoke, 6 a speck of
dust in the eye,1 a trivial jolt or jar,, and a forcible seating on the floor.'9
Perhaps the most absurd finding of "impact" occurred where the defendant's
horse "evacuated his bowels" into the plaintiff's lap. 20

As one commentator

noted, "The magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the door opens to the full
joy of a complete recovery."'"
However, an experience could be just as frightening and just as apt to
cause mental anguish regardless of whether the victim suffers impact or narrowly
escapes it. Thus, an increasing majority of the courts have repudiated the "impact" requirement and have regarded the physical consequences themselves or
11
12

32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 -U.S. 577 (1929).
Id. at 940.

13 E.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v.
Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa.
548, 61 Ati. 1022 (1905). See ANNOT. 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 (1959).
14 E.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Batta~la v State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Sanums v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289,
358 P.2d 344 (1961). See ANNO. 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 143 (1959).
15 Homans v. Boston Elev. R.R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902).
16 Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio 115, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930).
17 Porter v. Deleware, L. & W. R. Co., 73 N.J. 405, 63 At. 860 (N.J. 1906).
18 Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa.Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
19 Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910).
20 Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928).
21 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. Rav. 497, 504 (1922).
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the circumstances of the validity of the claim.2" Dean Prosser has stated that

"so far as substantial justice is concerned, it would seem that it is possible to
have equal assurance that the mental disturbance is genuine when the plaintiff
escapes 'impact' by a yard."'" In 1961, with the now-famous case of Battalla
v. State,24 New York joined in the repudiation of impact as a necessary requirement of recovery for mental disturbance. There, the defendant's employee failed
to properly fasten the seat belt of an infant's ski lift chair, and on descending,
the infant became hysterical, later suffering physical injuries. Recovery was allowed despite the plaintiff's inability to show physical impact. The trend is also
observable in workmen's compensation cases," typified by Carter v. General
Motors Corp.," where the plaintiff, continually berated by his foreman, feared
layoff and suffered emotional collapse. In granting compensation, the court
said that mental injuries are not to be treated as different from physical injuries,
but the question is whether they are accidental and arise out of the employment.
Mental disability, insanity, hysteria and its various manifestations, such as
hysterical blindness, neuritis, paralysis and neurasthenia, caused by or attributable
to an accident or injury are compensable."r
Courts are, however, in accord in some situations. Generally, damages are
recoverable for an intentional tort although physical injury is not sustained.
In such cases, mental suffering, including shame from indignities, is usually
considered compensable. 8 There is the usual requirement, however, that com-

pensable injury be the ordinary, natural and proximate consequence of the
wrong sought to be redressed.' 9 In State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village
of Isle,"° the Minnesota court said that damages for mental anguish or suffering
cannot be awarded where there has been no accompanying physical injury, unless there has been some conduct on the part of the defendant, constituting a
direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights, such as slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction or other similar wilful, wanton, or malicious conduct. This view
22 E.g., Penick v. Mirro, 189 F.Supp. 947 '(E.D. Va. 1960); Houston Elec. Co. v.
Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W.2d 546 (1946); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.
2d 345 (1957). As of 1964, twenty-three states had repudiated the "impact requirement.
See PROSSER, TORTS 351 n.99 (3 ed. 1964). RESTATEMENT, TORTS 2D § 313 adopts this
view.
23 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 351.
24 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overruling Mitchell v.
Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (denied recovery for miscarriage resulting
from fright negligently induced by defendant).
25 See Lavorci, Traumatic Neurosis: Is It Compensable?, 44 CH. BAR RECoRD 330 (April
1963). See also, Workmen's Compensation Awards For Psychroneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE
L. J. 1129 (1961).
26 261 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
27 Lavorci, op. cit. supra note 25 at 330.
28 E.g., Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (solicitation of illicit intercourse); Browning v. Slenderella
Systems, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959). See also RESTATEm-NT, TORTS 2D § 46,
which states that one who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional
distress to another is liable for such emotional distress as well as for bodily harm resulting
from it.
29 E.g., Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955); cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930);
Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal.App. 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1953).
30 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963).
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is shared by the majority of courts.31 It precludes recovery for mere fright or
shock, without accompanying physical injury.32 Similarly, recovery is normally
denied where the fright is caused by a wrong done to a third person." An
exception is made by some courts where the plaintiff is also in danger, though
there is no physical "impact." The general rule, however, is that in the
absence of an allegation of malice or intent to do harm, there must be either an
immediate physical invasion of the plaintiff's person or security or a direct
possibility of such invasion in order that recovery may be had for mental anguish
or distress of mind."
While courts will normally allow recovery for the intentional infliction of
mental pain and anguish unaccompanied by damage to the person or his purse,
the majority refuse to allow damages for fright, shock or mental disturbance
negligently inflicted where there are no such accompanying damages. " However, where the fright or shock produces some physical injury, a majority of
courts will allow damages for such injuries and accompanying mental disturbance
or anguish." Falzone v. Busch"' represents a typical holding on the subject.
There the court said that where negligence causes fright from reasonable fear
of immediate personal injury, which fright is adequately demonstrated to have
resulted in substantial bodily injury or sickness, the injured person may recover
if such bodily injury or sickness would be regarded as proper elements of damage
had they occurred as the consequence of a direct physical injury rather than
fright. The court held that the plaintiff could recover for any substantial bodily
injury or sickness proximately resulting from the defendant's negligence in
operating his car so close to the defendant as to put her in fear for her safety
despite lack of physical "impact." Similarly, Hopper v. United States" held
that a person who has suffered physical injury induced by nervous shock negligently inflicted is entitled to the opportunity to prove that such injury is
genuine. This is the proper view to be taken.
31 E.g., Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961); Barry v. Baugh, 111
Ga.App. 813, 143 S.E.2d 489 (1965); Towler v. Jackson, 111 Ga.App. 8, 140 S.E.2d 295
(1965); Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113 Ohio App. 449, 172 N.E.2d 734 (1961).
32 E.g., Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 58, 163 S.W.2d 21 (1942) (such damages
too easily simulated and difficult to disprove); Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113 Ohio App. 449,
172 N.E.2d 734 (1961); Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 399 Pa. 26, 159 A.2d 216 (1960).
33 E.g., Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F.Supp. 453 (D. Or. 1962) (sympathy for suffering
of another); Angst v. Great Northern Ry., 131 F.Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955) (fright due
to wrong against third person; Duet v. Cheramie, 176 So.2d 667 (La. App. 1965) (one
person cannot recover damages for worry, anxiety, depression, mental anguish, or other mental
suffering as result of injuries to another). Some exceptions are made, however, as where the
injury is malicious. See Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195, 151 A.2d 690 (1959).
34 Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Bowman v. Williams, 164
Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933). There is authority to the contrary, however. See Strazza v.
McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959).
35 E.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Logan v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 400 P.2d 296 *(Wash. 1965); Murphy v. City of Tacoma, 60 Wash.2d 603, 374
P.2d 976 (1962). See RESTATEfENT, ToRTs 2D § 46.
36 E.g., Leatherman v. Gateway Trans. Co., 331 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1964); Soldinger v.
United States, 247 F.Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1965); Floyd v. Stevens-Davenport Funeral Home,
110 Ga. App. 271, 138 S.E.2d 333 (1964).
37 E.g., Mack v. Hugh W. Comstock Associates, Inc., 37 Cal.Rptr. 466 (1964); Slaughter
v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965); Thacker v. Ward, 263 N.C. 594, 140
S.E.2d 23 (1965).
38 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
39 244 F.Supp. 314 (D. Col. 1965). Cf. Kirk v. Marshall, 247 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952).
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However, where mental pain and suffering are the sole bases on which
recovery is sought, the majority of courts deny recovery of substantial damages.'
Cosgrove v. Beymer 4" held that where negligent conduct results only in emotional
disturbance and no bodily injury or sickness is present, there can be no recovery.
That court said this rule includes such disturbances as fright, nervous shock
and grief and is applicable even though these disturbances are accompanied by
physical manifestations such as dizziness, headaches, nervousness and the like,
so long as they do not result in bodily harm. The better rule is that given in
Sahuc v. U. S. Fid. And Guar. Co.,42 where the court held that recovery may be
had for fright or nervous shock unaccompanied by physical injury evidenced
by objective symptoms. Similarly, the court in Rogers v. Hexol, Inc." held that
recovery could be allowed for emotional distress incidental to and directly resulting from violation of a person's right to be free from personal hurt, his right
of privacy or property and probably the right to be free from fear for his safety.
Under proper circumstances, this is conducive to greater justice than a rule
denying all recovery for mental anguish unless it is accompanied by either
precipitating or resulting physical manifestations. There are two types of cases
where there is a tendency to allow recovery solely for mental disturbance. An
increasing minority allow recovery for the negligent transmission of messages
which indicate on their faces that there is a special likelihood that mental distress
will result." The second special class of cases, now representing a majority view,
allow recovery for mental distress resulting from the negligent mishandling of
corpses.45
To discover which view is the most reasonable and productive of substantial
justice, one must look to the various factors which must be balanced against
each other. The essential interrelationship of the physical organism with the emotional or mental has been experimentally and clinically demonstrated. In view
of modem psychosomatic discoveries, little doubt remains that emotions are
accompanied and followed by definite and readily observable physical reactions."
There is, however, conflict as to the degree of stimuli required to produce a
traumatic neuroses of the type complained of by the plaintiff in Parrish. It has
been said that serious deleterious physical consequences are very unlikely to
40 E.g., Solding v. United States, 247 F.Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1965); Gautier v. General
Tel. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1965); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683
(1965).
41 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965).
42 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1963).
43 218 F.Supp. 453 (D. Or. 1962). Cf. Paul v. Rodgers Bottling Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1960) (held error not to allow recovery for mental anguish where plaintiff discovered dead
mouse in bottle from which he was drinking).
44 E.g., Archer v. Continental Assur. Co., 107 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ky. 1952), Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930); Russ v. Western Union TeL
Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943). But, the majority of state courts deny recovery
in such instances. See Corcoran v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 80 Wash. 570, 142 Pac. 29 (1917).
The federal rule, which controls as to interstate messages, denies such recovery in the absence
of resulting physical harm. See Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1955). See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 348.
45 E.g., Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181
(1959) (negligent embalming); Torres v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup.
Ct. 1962) (unauthorized burial); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949)
(leaky casket).
46 Smith, Relation Of Emotions To Injury And Disease, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 213 (1944).
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result from a single, brief emotional experience, except where there is a predisposition for such a result.4" Other authorities claim that the average person
does not usually suffer injury from psychic stimuli such as fright and that psychic
injury is usually the sign of a pre-existing disorder." One view is that "[i]n
some traumatic psychoneuroses, a sense of grievance, and even a desire for revenge, help to sustain the symptoms in some cases until compensation or some
other satisfaction is obtained." 49 Such symptoms as the plaintiff allegedly suffered in Parrish are often an over-reaction to present danger. This "fright"
psychoneurosis may not be manifest immediately following the causal experience,
but may be repressed and the anxiety symptoms may not occur until after a
latent period."0
In Parrish,the plaintiff also alleged an increase in blood pressure following
the accident. Her psychiatrist testified that, in his opinion, the condition was
caused by an emotional basis, and was of the type classified as a psychophysiologic cardiovascular reaction found in nervous cases.51 In view of present
psychiatric knowledge, there is no reason to dispute the fact that this condition
could have been caused by the shock or fright of the collision. To flatly deny
recovery for such condition, where the probability of its causation can be proven
is to deny recovery for the invasion of a person's rights. Some commentators
argue that since authorities are in some agreement that there usually is a predisposition or increased susceptibility to such traumatic neurosis or psychiatric
conversion, recovery should be denied.5 2 However, it is a recognized rule of
torts that if an actor's conduct is negligent in creating unreasonable risks of
injury to the average person, the fact that the plaintiff's unknown idiosyncrasy
or subnormal resistance to such stimuli causes him to sustain excessive injury
will neither defeat nor lessen the defendant's liability for damages.53 Negligence
having been properly established, a wrongdoer must take his victim as he finds
him." It has been suggested that it is legally erroneous and socially unjust to
compensate such sufferers on the basis that the neurosis develops as a new and
original condition, and that such cases should properly be regarded as instances
of aggravation of pre-existing injuries and compensated accordingly. 5 No matter
which view is taken, the fact remains that the injury does exist and the one who
inflicted it should pay for the consequences of his acts.
Some contend that in such cases of mental disturbance, the necessary link
between the negligent act and the psychic injury cannot be established to show
47. Id. at 225-26.
48 McNiece, Psychic Injury And Tort Liability In New York, 24

78 (1949).

ST. JOHN'S

L. Rzv. 1,

49

Henderson and Gillespie, A TaxT-Boox OF PSYCHATRY 207 (8th ed. 1956).

51

Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 4, Parrish v. United States, 357 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

50 Ibid.

52 Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses In Court, 30 VA. L. RIv. 87, 90-91 (1943).

53 The defendant is liable when his negligence operates on a concealed existing physical
condition. E.g., Trascher v. Eagle Indem. Co., 48 So.2d 695 (La. App. 1950) (ruptured
intervertebral disc); Heppner v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 297 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1956)
(latent disease); Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d (1962) (neurotic predisposition). See Smith, op. cit. supra note 46, at 256.
54 This doctrine originated in Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901). See Williams,
The Risk Principle, 77 L. Q. REv. 179, 193-97 (1961). See also, cases cited note 51 supra.

55 Smith and Solomon, op. cit. supra note 52, at 90-91.
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causation., Courts typically require that all damages must flow directly and
naturally from the wrong and must be certain, both in their nature and in
respect to the cause from which they proceed. 7 Expert testimony can show the
probability of the causal link, and in such tort cases, the proof required is only
a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
psychologist can be utilized to establish the fact of the injury and its causation. 8
Juries in such cases should be cautioned that "negligence is not proved unless
it appears from a preponderance of the credible evidence that defendant's
conduct created an unreasonable and forseeable risk of causing injurious psychic
reactions in a person possessed of average health and resistance to injury by
such stimuli."5
The question of damages for personal injuries is peculiarly one of fact for
the jury."0 Dean Prosser states that:
It is now more or less generally conceded that the only valid objection
against recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and
fictitious claims. ... It is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon
satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is nothing to corroborate the
clair, or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances
of the case ....

The very clear tendency of the recent cases is to refuse

to admit incompetence to deal with
such a problem, and to find some
61
basis for redress in a proper case.
Battalla v. State62 enunciated the correct modem policy for suits to recover
damages for mental disturbance. The New York court said that the fact that
the proof may be speculative is no longer a bar to litigation. The court will
look to the quality of the proof and will rely on its own ability, with that of
the jury and the medical profession, to sift out dishonest claims. If a defendant
has breached a forseeable duty owing to the plaintiff, he will be liable for the
consequences directly traceable to the negligent act." The fear that there will be
a vast increase in vexatious litigation, without such requirements as "impact"
or substantial physical injury, may be met by examining the Canadian experi56 E.g., Justesen v. Pennsylvania R.R. 92 N.J.L. 257,
West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 N.J. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (1900);
N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
57 E.g., United States v. Goodman, 111 F.Supp. 32
Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 131 N.W.2d 393 (1964); Poser v.
S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
58

106 Atl. 137 (1919); Ward v.
Mitchell v. Rochester R.R., 151
(W.D. N.C. 1953); Baylor v.
Gene Mohr Chevrolet Co., 377

Lassen, The Psychologist as an Expert Witness in Assessing Mental Disease or Defect,

50 A.B.A. JOURNAL 239 (1964).
59 Smith, op. cit. supra note 46, at 305.
60 E.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 172 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1964); Hylak v. Marcal
Inc., 335 Ill.
App. 48, 80 N.E.2d 411 (1948); Simmons v. United Transit 'Co., 208 A.2d
537 (R.I. 1965); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
61 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 347-48.
62 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
63 E.g., Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So.2d 145 (La. App. 1961) '(breach
of duty to warn parent of nature of poison taken by his child); Greenberg v. Stanley, 51
N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods. Co., 182 Wash. 578,
47 P.2d 1037 (1935). In Orlo v. Connecticut 'Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941), the
court said that the test is whether the ordinary man in the defendant's position, knowing what
he knew or should have known, can anticipate the harm of the general nature of that suffered
was likely to result. This, the court felt, was the ultimate test of whether a duty to use due
care existed.
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ence. In Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas," the "impact" rule was laid
down and in Dulieu v. White and Sons.." it was repudiated. There has been no
appreciable increase in such litigation in the Commonwealth." s The argument that
recovery for psychic injuries would "open a Pandora's box" of endless litigation
was echoed by a Pennsylvania court in the harsh decision of Bosley v. Andrews."
To this Prosser has replied:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a "flood of litigation"; and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the
ground that it will give the court too much work to do.68
One competent authority has stated:
Presence or absence of impact is not of much consequence in determining the merits of a claim for injury through psychic stimuli. It has
only slight materiality unless courts require that the impact be substantial
enough to increase the risk of nervous shock already created by the episode.
That the impact was substantial enough to increase nervous
69 shock is an
issue which calls for testimony of competent medical men.
However, with the increasing repudiation of the "impact" requirement and the
finding of "impact" in any contact, courts have shown that their prior confidence in the "impact" requirement to minimize fraud and simulation in the
litigation field has been misplaced. Similarly, the requirement of substantial
physical injury, though its goal is meritorious, provides no adequate assurance
of a bona fide claim, but does operate to deny recovery in meritorious claims
where by chance, the claimant has suffered no substantial physical injury.
One who suffers loss by the negligence of another is entitled to such damages
as will replace his loss and make him whole. The good faith of the wrongdoer
in such a situation is irrelevant."0 Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate
in financial terms and no less a real injury than "physical" pain."' "The loss
of well-being is as much a loss as an amputation. ' 72 Where the guarantee of
validity can be found and the mental distress is undoubtedly real and serious,
there is no essential reason to deny recovery."' If our law is committed to the
principle Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium, there is no wrong without a remedy, then
in all justice it would seem that a negligent defendant should be required to pay
for the injuries he has created, whether they be physical or mental, providing
proof has been adduced to show causal relationship and forseeability or a duty
owing to the plaintiff. As Prosser has stated in speaking of the "impact" re64

13 A.C. 222 (1888).
2 K.B. 669 (1901).
66 28 BROoxLYN L. REv. 180, 184 n.23 (1962).
67 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
68 Prosser, Intentional Infliction Of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MicH. L. Rlv.
65

874 (1939).

69 Smith, op. cit. supra note 46, at 299.
70 Woods v. Slocum, 179 So.2d 464 (La. 1965).
71 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, 20 Mica.
(1922).
72 Corcoran v. McNea], 400 Pa. 14, 21, 161 A.2d 367, 372 (1960).
73 See Note, 21 CORN. L. Q. 166 (1936).
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quirement: "It is almost certainly destined for total extinction. . .. [I]n
general, it seems clear that the courts which deny all remedy in such cases
[lack of impact] are fighting a rear guard action." 4 The requirement for substantial physical injury, as required by the district court in Parrish,will meet a
similar fate. The logic in both requirements is a rather sad commentary on legal
reasoning. In rejecting the "impact" rule, the court in Falzone v. Busch,7
stated that the impact rule meant that a tort-feasor would be liable if he
negligently scratched his victim but not if he scared him to death. Such a result
is far from a triumph of reason! More advanced courts are now reacting more
reasonably as was seen in Caposella v. Kelley, " where the New York Supreme
Court awarded damages to the survivors of a 53-year-old man who died of a
heart attack from negligently inflicted fright when the defendant's auto cut
across his lawn. He was frightened to death.
In Parrish, the trial court found by uncontradicted testimony that the
appellant suffered from frequent headaches, inability to sleep and had changed
from a normal, well-adjusted, happy person to an irritable, nervous and antisocial individual after the accident.77 Yet, itdenied damages for failure to show
substantial physical injuries. While there may have been reasons for rejecting
the accident as the cause of her hypertension, such as being overweight, it would
appear that to unequivocally require serious physical injuries as a prerequisite
for established mental disturbance is to work substantial injustice on those who
have suffered an invasion of their right of well-being but have not suffered substantial physical injuries. In relying on past precedents such as Perry v. Capital
Traction Co.,7 8 decided in 1929 when psychiatry was in its infancy, the district
court in Parrishignored the tremendous scientific strides which have been made
in the field of mental disturbances. The Court of Appeals takes a much more
reasonable view, in remanding the case for findings on whether the appellant's
alleged psychiatric disorders were a proximate result of the physical injuries she
sustained in the accident. As aptly stated by Lord Wright:
[A]n absolute assertion of the paramount importance of certainty in the
law might well destroy the flexibility and sensitiveness to realism and facts
and social values, which have been the pride of the common law. Great
judges have said that the function of the common law was the perpetual
should be sorry if quest for certitude were substituted
quest for justice. I 79
for quest for justice.
John W. Nelson

74 PRossER, TORTS 351-52 (3d ed. 1964). See alignment of states in ANNOT., 64
A.L.R.2d 100 (1959).
75 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
F.2d ........
(D.C. Cir.
76 Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 10, Parrish v. United States-........
1966) (caposella).
77 Id. at 11.
78 32 F.2d 938 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 577 (1929).
79 Note, 66 L. Q. Rv.454, 456 (1950).

